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NOTES
SUBORDINATION OF MORTGAGE-GUARANTOR'S CLAIM IN
BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS*
IN the course of bankruptcy proceedings for the principal debtors sif
mortgages serviced by New York's large mortgage-guaranty companies,'
federal courts have had to determine the applicability of the highly developed
local case law 2 adjusting the relationships betweeen mortgagor, guaranty
company, and the holders of participating mortgage certificates.3 In many
New York insolvency cases the guaranteeing company, holding a retained
or reacquired interest in its own certificate issue, has claimed the right to
share in the mortgage security on a parity with the public holders. The
state decisions,4 however, have required clear and unmistakable contractual
stipulation to entitle the guarantor to participate in the security on an equal
basis with public claimants.
In Geist v. Prudence Realization Corporation,5 a recent case arising in
the Section 77B reorganization0 of a corporation holding property subject
to a mortgage, the federal District Court for the Eastern District of New
York applied this state rule and subordinated certificates owned by the
bankrupt guarantor of that issue to those publicly held. The Prudence
Company and the Prudence-Bonds Corporation, twin subsidiaries of New
York Investors, Incorporated, were together engaged in the mortgage-
guaranty business. 7 According to their customary procedure,8 Prudence,
* Geist v. Prudence Realization Corp., 127 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2l, 1941). Peti-
tion for certiorari filed with Supreme Court, Nov. 24, 1941.
1. The exclusion from federal bankruptcy jurisdiction of banking and insurance
companies has forced most of the mortgage-guaranty companies to seek liquidation or
rehabilitation under local statutes. 52 ST.AT. 845 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §22 (Supp. 1939);
1z re New York Title & Mortgage Co., 9 F. Supp. 319 (N. D. X. Y. 1934). Altlhugh
organized under the state banking law, the guarantor in the principal case was allowed
to undergo § 77B reorganization as a banking corporation in name only. In re Prudence
Co., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 33 (E. D. N. Y. 1935).
2. Where the mortgage-guaranty company has bken liquidated or rehabilitated
locally, the New York statutes have provided an elaborate administrative mechanism,
protecting both guaranty company and public certificate holders. N. Y. U:MiCONsOLWATw
LAWS, §§ 1751-1852. See Comment (1934) 34 Cvt. L. R-v. 663.
3. These certificates represent fractional undivided shares in a single bond and mort-
gage or in groups of bonds and mortgages.
4. Pink v. Thomas, 282 N. Y. 10, 24 N. E. (2d) 724 (1939); Matter of Lawyers
Title & Guaranty Co. (236 West Seventieth St), 164 Misc. 292, 298 X. Y. Supp. 65
(Sup. Ct 1937).
5. 1292 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
6. Presumably the same issues would arise today in a proceeding for corporate re-
organization under Chapter X.
7. The procedure used by the tao companies was deviational in method, but normal
in result. Usually a single guarantor appraises the security, advances the loan, deposits
bond and mortgage with a depository, and issues the guaranteed certificates.
8. This procedure is described in detail in In re Westover, Inc., 92 F. (2d) 177
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
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after lending funds to a New York realty company on a bond and real
property mortgage, assigned both to Prudence-Bonds, which placed them
in a public depository.9 Prudence-Bonds then issued and Prudence guaran-
teed and sold to the public $382,800 worth of certificates representing frac-
tional shares in the bond and mortgage. By various subsequent transactions,
Prudence acquired $816.67 in these certificates'0 and a $7,200 uncertificated
balance of the loan." Thereafter, in 1935, Prudence underwent reorgani-
zation under Section 77B, and Prudence Realization Corporation, respondent
in the principal case, emerged from this proceeding as its successor. Anal-
gamated Properties, Incorporated, a subsidiary of Prudence, obtained the
property subject to the Prudence mortgage by foreclosure of a junior mort-
gage in 1933, but in 1936 it filed a voluntary petition for reorganization
under Section 77B. During this Amalgamated proceeding a plan for the
reorganization of this certificate issue 12 was confirmed, and Geist, petitioner
in the principal case, was appointed trustee. But the order of confirmation
did not decide the question of the participation to be granted Prudence on
its $8,016.67 interest in the bond and mortgage. Geist brought the present
action by petitioning in the Amalgamated proceeding for an order subor-
dinating the Prudence claim, now held by the Prudence Realization Cor-
poration, to the, claims of the public certificate holders. With one judge
dissenting,13 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court
in following the New York law and subordinating the interest held by the
Prudence Realization Corporation.
This New York rule14 in the guaranty situation is an exception to the general
proposition that assignment of an aliquot share of a mortgage does not
subordinate the interest retained by the assignor.'r In determining the rights
9. The depository, Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, authenticated all
certificates as issued, following the institutional practice in the business.
10. Certificates with face values of $500 and $300 were reacquired by Prudence on
May 29, 1932, when their owners requested a change in investment to another of Pru-
dence-Bonds' issues. A certificate representing a $16.67 balance after several transactions
was issued to Prudence on October 26, 1932.
11. Prudence claimed the uncertificated portion of the issue as assignee of Prudence-
Bonds, a theory that would have gained it parity participation since Prudence-Bonds
made no guaranty. Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Mortgage Commission, 273 N. Y. 415,
7 N. E. (2d) 841 (1937). The court held, however, that Prudence was in fact tile equit-
able owner of this interest at all times. Geist v. Prudence Realization Corp., 122 F. (2d)
503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). Strict contract construction has often denied equal participation
to such an uncertificated interest where the guaranty agreement has permitted the com-
pany only to hold "certificates." Matter of People (Union Guaranty & Mortgage Co.),
285 N. Y. 337, 34 N. E. (2d) 345 (1941).
12. Under the state practice, reorganization of a single certificate issue, or of groups
of issues, took place in the guaranteeing company's statutory insolvency proceeding.
13. Judges Clark and Swan comprised the majority. Judge Frank dissented with
opinion.
14. Other jurisdictions have a similar rule. In re Phillippi, 329 Pa. 581, 198 AtI. 16
(1938); accord, Louisville Title Co.'s Rec. v. Crab Orchard Banking Co., 249 Ky. 736,
61 S. W. (2d) 615 (1933).
15. Where the assignor, not also a guarantor, has retained an interest, the courts
are divided, but New York allows the assignor to participate on a parity with the as-
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of the guarantor, the local courts have consistently announced that the
intention of the parties as expressed in their contract of guaranty shall
govern.16 But in construing intention, which is rarely ex-plicit,1 7 courts have
arrived at the exception by resorting to the maxim that a contract shall be
construed against its author,'8 and by invoking a presumption that the
parties intended to subordinate the guarantor's certificates. 10
The sole basis of this New York rule, however, does not lie in judicial
construction of the guaranty contracts. The role of the guaranty as produc-
ing a "special equity"20 or a "debtor-creditor" 2'1 relationship, or as raising
an "equitable rule"22 has been constantly reiterated by the local courts. Such
terminology suggests that state courts have been applying a rule of in-
signee. Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Mortgage Commission. 273 N. Y. 415, 7 X. E.
(2d) 841 (1937). This is not true, however, where a trust relationship e:ists, Fullerton
v. National B. & T. Ins. Co., 100 N. Y. 76, 2 N. E. 629 ( 1,S5) ; accord, D,.meyer v. O'0n-
nell, 364 Ill. 467, 4 N. E. (2d) 830 (1936). Other jurisdictions, however, treat the assign-
ment itself as an equity demanding subordination of the interest of the assignor. Georgia
Realty Co. v. Bank of Covington, 19 Ga. App. 219, 91 S. E. 267 (1917); 3 Ponmoy,
EQuiTY JuT srjuDExN (4th ed. 1918) § 1203.
16. Matter of Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan Cuunty, 275 X. Y. 347,
9 N. E. (2d) 957 (1937). Substantially similar doctrine appears in the early cases. Me-
chanics Bank v. Bank of Niagara, 9 Wend. 410 (N. Y. 1832).
17. Apparently this problem was not anticipated by the authors of the guaranty con-
tracts. Many if the agreements, however, contained a clause that each share would h
"equal and coordinate" with all other shares assigned or retained by the company. But
without exception such language has been declared an insufficient expression of intent
to accord parity participation to the guarantor. Pink v. Thomas, 282 N. Y. 10, 24 N. E.
(2d) 724 (1939); Matter of Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, 275
N. Y. 347, 9 N. E. (2d) 957 (1937).
18. 'Matter of Lawyers Title & Guaranty Co. (236 West Seventieth St.), 164 Misc.
292, 298 N. Y. Supp. 666 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Matter of New York Title & Mortgage Co.
(Series N-9), 163 Misc. 196, 296 N. Y. Supp. 273 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
19. In several cases the decision has been based entirely upon the presumption ol
subordination. Matter of Bond & Mortgage Guaranty Co. (223 Second Ave.), 169 Misc.
196, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 254 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd 'zthout opinion, 255 App. Div. 765, 7 N.
Y. S. (2d) 255 (1st Dep't 1938) ; Matter of Lavvyers Title & Guaranty Co. (236 Vest
Seventieth St.), 164 Misc. 292, 298 N. Y. Supp. 666 (Sup. Ct. 1937). In some cases,
however, the decision has been based upon the presumption as reenforced by actual in-
tent. atter of Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, 275 N. Y. 347, 9
N. E. (2d) 957 (1937) ; 'Matter of La%,.yers Mortgage Co. (545 West End Ave.), 157
Misc. 813, 284 N. Y. Supp. 740 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd wTihout ophion, 272 N. Y. 554,
4 N. E. (2d) 733 (1936).
20. In Matter of Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, 275 N. Y. 347,
9 N. E. (2d) 957 (1937), the presumption was derived from "special equities". See
Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Mortgage Commission, 273 N. Y. 415, 7 N. E. (2d) 841
(1937).
21. Unmentioned in the early Supreme Court decisions, the "debtor-creditor" con-
cept was first stressed by the Court of Appeals as a reason for subordinating the guaran-
tor. Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Mortgage Commission, 273 N. Y. 415, 7 N. E.
(2d) 841 (1937) ; Pink v. Thomas, 282 N. Y. 10, 24 N. E. (2d) 724 (1939). This reason-
ing would seem to be enlightening principally as a statement of the result of the local
cases-that the guarantor is subordinated in the absence of contractual stipulation.
22. Pink v. Thomas, 282 N. Y. 10, 24 N. E. (2d) 724 (1939).
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solvency administration in allocating the principal debtor's assets among
its creditors.
23
The frequent subordination of the guarantor resulting from the application
of this rule is important in avoiding circuity of action where the guarantor
is solvent.24 But this justification vanishes where the insolvencies of mort-
gagor and guaranty company place public certificate holders in the class of
general creditors in the guarantor's bankruptcy. In this situation, equality
of participation in the mortgagor's2 5 insolvency proceeding would allow the
interest of the guarantor in the issue to become a part of the assets of its
bankruptcy estate for division among all of its general creditors. But subor-
dination in the mortgagor's bankruptcy of the certificates held by the in-
solvent guarantor reduces the amount of assets available for distribution in
the guarantor's insolvency proceeding. And by holding back these assets
from distribution to all the general creditors of the guarantor and awarding
them to the public holders of the particular issue, the court in the mortgagor's
bankruptcy in effect accords priority in the guarantor's insolvency proceeding
to the holders of a single certificate issue over other general creditors of
the guarantor 26 to the extent of the guarantor's interest in that issue." 7
Confronted in the principal case with the ambiguous phraseology of the
New York guarantor-interest opinions, the majority interpreted the state
subordination rule as a local construction of guaranty contracts.28 The court
23. The majority mentioned and dismissed a third possible category for the New
York law-a rule attributing a certain legal result to a contract. See American Lumber-
men's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Timms & Howard, Inc., 108 F. (2d) 497, 502 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939),
holding that an insurance policy must be read as containing a statutory provision.
24. While New York expressly repudiated this reasoning as a basis for the sub-
ordination rule in Matter of Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. of Sullivan County, 275
N. Y. 347, 9 N. E. (2d) 957 (1937), it has been adopted in other states. Kelly v, Mid-
dlesex Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592, 171 Atl. 823 (1934), aft'd, 116
N. J. Eq. 574, 174 Ati. 706 (1934) ; see also Preston v. Morsman, 75 Neb. 358, 106 N.
W. 320 (1905). In these states, where the guarantor is insolvent, the public holders must
share the security with the certificates held by the guaranteeing company. Kelly v. Mid-
dlesex Title Guaranty & Trust Co., ibid.
25. Although the principal case arose in the insolvency proceeding of a corporation
holding property subject to the mortgage, the party holding the property securing the
mortgage will, for purposes of convenience, be referred to as if it were always the mort-
gagor.
26. The RFC held a claim of $11,357,577.45. Claims on guaranteed mortgage cer-
tificates amounted to $50,857,852.86, and on guaranteed bonds issued by Prudence-Bonds
to $58,833,179.79. Matter of Prudence Co., Inc., E. D. N. Y., May 26, 1939, p. 7.
27. Kelly v. Middlesex Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 115 N. J. Eq. 592, 171 Atd.
823 (1934), aff'd, 116 N. J. Eq. 574, 174 AtI. 706 (1934) ; accord, In re Rodewald, 24 F.
Supp. 905 (S. D. Ill. 1938).
28. At least one other bankruptcy court has been faced with the problem of the in-
stant case. In re Rodewald, 24 F. Supp. 905 (S. D. Ill. 1938). While the opinion in that
case is not clear, apparently the court first decided that Illinois law, rather than Florida
law, governed; and then, ignoring the Illinois law, granted equal participation to secured
notes held by a partnership, its partners, and the public. Some of the publicly held notes
were guaranteed. The opinion cites no authority and states no general principles. For
an analogous principal-surety problem, see note 40 infra.
conceived itself bound by Erie Railroad v. Tompkins' to follow this state
construction and interpreted the guaranty agreement as a contract between
guarantor and assignee to subordinate the interest of the former in the event
of reorganization or liquidation of the mortgage security.Z0 Since these extra-
bankruptcy priority contracts generally have been held operative in the
federal courts through their equitable powers,31 most cases have indicated
that the intention to subordinate should be clear and the surrounding cir-
cumstances should be conducive to the application of equitable rules. The
decision in the principal case, however, goes beyond this general policy,
since the court determined intention by resorting to the New York pre-
sumption of guarantor subordination.
Although not clearly indicating the discretionary nature of the court's
power to effectuate the extra-bankruptcy priority agreement, the majority
did stress the desirability of according similar treatment to all creditors
of New York mortgage-guaranty companies before any state or federal
tribunal. While such an objective in bankruptcy suggests a marked extension
in the policy of the Tompkins case,32 the fact that investments in all of the
state guaranty companies "were made under substantially identical condi-
tions" influenced the majority.33 As secondary factors also favoring subor-
dination of the guarantor, the court pointed out that Prudence Realization
Corporation, successor to the rights of the guarantor, took with full notice
of the probable subordination;34 and that the mortgaged property was held
by the guarantor's wholly owned subsidiary, Amalgamated Properties, Incor-
porated.35
29. 304 U. S. 64 (1938). Since the Tompkins case it has been generally held that
the federal courts must follow local construction of contracts. Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co., 304 U. S. 202 (193); Shell Oil Co., Inc. v. Manley Oil Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2.39
(E. D. Ill. 1941).
30. The typical contract of this nature is between several creditors, subordinating the
claims of one or more to the claims of the others upon the debtor's insolvency. Bank of
America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Erickson, 117 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) ;
Bird & Son Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935). Such agreements
are usually employed by creditors to obtain new funds and credit for a debtor in pogr
financial condition.
31. Bird & Son Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. Sth, 1935); Searle
v. Mechanics Loan & Trust Co., 249 Fed. 942 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918), cert. ddced, 243
U. S. 592 (1918) ; see Note (1936) 100 A. L. R. 660.
32. The Tompkins case expressly excepted "matters governed by the Federal Con-
stitution or by Acts of Congress" from its policy of following local law. The federal
court's bankruptcy jurisdiction is based upon a Congressional act, which is in turn ground-
ed in Constitutional authority. U. S. Coxsr.. Art. I. § 8.
33. Such reasoning might be extended to any of the heretofore "federal" fields of
law.
34. One possible answer is that other certificate holders and general creditors of the
guarantor, who actually make up its successur corporation, did not take with notice of
subordination. See dissent of Judge Frank in Geist v. Prudence Realization Corp., 122
F. (2d) 503, 507 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
35. But at the times of flotation of the participating certificates (apparently in the
late twenties) and the later acquisition of an interest by the guarantor (May-Oct., 1932),
the property was owned by a realty company seemingly unconnected with the guarantor.
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The dialectic confusion of the state opinions, however, justifies interpreting
them not only as construing contracts of guaranty, but as applying a rule
of insolvent liquidation in allocating mortgage security among competing
claims. 6 Support for this interpretation lies in the fact that the rights
concerned in the guarantor-interest cases apparently do not freeze until
distribution of the estate of the principal debtor. The fixing of rights at this
time would seem to follow from the New York opinions, since neither the
insolvency of the primary obligor, nor even the insolvency and liquidation
of the guarantor,8 7 invokes the rule of subordination. If the rule is not
applied in these situations, the only occasion presenting the issue of guarantor
participation is the liquidation of the primary obligor; and it becomes apparent
that the rule may constitute a method of distributing that estate, for it is
only at this juncture that all concerned rights are fixed. Further indication
that this New York law is primarily a rule of insolvency administration lies
in its use in statutory proceedings for the rehabilitation or liquidation of
the guaranty companies and their mortgage issues, with little reliance on
pre-depression precedent.88
If the New York .rule is viewed as one of insolvency administration, the
state guarantor-interest decisions cease to bind the federal court, and the
usual principles of bankruptcy proceedings control. Under these bankruptcy
rules, creditors are divided into classes according to the economic status of
their claims,89 and, as a corollary to this "fixed principle" of the Boyd case,
creditors of the same economic class must be accorded equal treatment,
subject to alteration by equitable factors.40 Applying these principles to the
The later acquisition (Feb., 1933) by the guarantor's subsidiary, through foreclosure of
a junior mortgage, came with no intimation of bad faith.
36. While the court in the instant case assumed the New York rule fell into one of
two generic categories, contract construction or insolvency administration, it is possible
that the court erred in assuming such a dichotomy existed.
37. Apparently the New York subordination rule is only applied when the guaran-
tor holds certificates at the time of distribution of the security, and where these certili-
cates are re-sold on the market or otherwise reach other holders, they are accorded parity
participation under the usual "equal and coordinate" lien clause. Matter of Lawyers Title
& Guaranty Co. (No. 424421), 165 Misc. 590, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 264 (Sup. Ct. 1937)
(guarantor's certificates assigned as security for a loan); Matter of Lawyers Mortgage
Co. (8718 Ridge Blvd.), 284 N. Y. 371, 31 N. E. (2d) 492 (1940) (certificate issued to
guarantor's subsidiary).
38. The state precedents cited in the New York guarantor-interest opinions usually
dealt with priority of concurrent mortgages. Granger v. Crouch, 86 N. Y. 494 (1881).
In none was there a holding on a guaranty situation.
39. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913) ; Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prod. Co., 308 U. S. 106 (1939). According to this rule, junior claims must either make
a new contribution or be subordinated to full compensation of senior interests. See (1940)
49 YALE L. j. 1099.
40. These equitable principles, for example, prevent a surety, who has undertaken
to pay creditors of the principal to a stated limit, from sharing on his subrogation claim
in the assets of the principal until all partially protected debts have been paid in full.
American Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 296 U. S. 133 (1935). On the
general problem, see Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 881; (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 892.
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instant case, it becomes apparent that variation from the fundamental bank-
ruptcy doctrine of equality must be predicated upon equitable considerations,
since the guarantor and the public claimants hold investments with identical
economic classification.
Several elements of the immediate situation favor according equality of
participation to the certificates held by the guaranteeing company. It is only
the circumstance of that company's choice to invest 41 in one of its own
issues, rather than to distribute the entire issue to the public, which leads
to its subordination in the principal case. Furthermore, the public holders
of other issues of mortgage participation certificates and miscellaneous other
creditors, in making their investment, relied upon the assets of the guaran-
teeing company, a part of which consisted of retained or reacquired shares.42
From the point of view of these other general creditors of the guarantor,
the participating certificates held by the company would be considered sub-
stituted value for general assets expended in their acquisition, a consideration
rejected by the decision in the instant case.
This "insolvency-rule" interpretation of the New York law is based upon
a policy of national similarity in bankruptcy remedy, as opposed to the
majority's argument that creditors should receive the same treatment within
a single state, whether liquidation occurs in a local or in a federal court. As
pointed out in Judge Frank's dissent, uniformity of bankruptcy administra-
tion throughout the United States is, by express Constitutional provision, 3
made paramount to federal conformity with the rule of a particular state.
This Constitutional mandate would seem to preclude a federal court from
following state insolvency law in order to promote local uniformity, espe-
cially where the bankruptcy rule is directly contrary, as in the instant case.
It is possible that the majority in the principal case confused two distinct
reasons for following the state rule and did not realize that adoption of
either the "contract-construction" or the "insolvency-rule" approach would
lead to a decision based upon equitable evaluation. For, in addition to con-
struing the guaranty contract in terms of the New York case law as an
extra-bankruptcy priority agreement, the court also asserted it was enforcing
the state rule of subordination as determining the "real basis" of the parties'
claims in the mortgagor's insolvency.4 4 But in this proceeding, the claims
of either the public certificate holders or the guarantor would appear to
41. Prudence intended to hold the reacquired certificates as investments. Affidavit
of William T. Coxwin, trustee of Prudence, Record on Appeal, p. 24, Geist v. Prudence
Realizatibn Corp., 122 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
42. No figures are available for the Prudence situation. In general, a substantial
part of the assets of these companies has been invested in retained or reacquired partici-
pating certificates. See (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 4S0, 483.
43. "The Congress shall have Power . . . to establish . . . uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . ." U. S. Co.n.sT., Art. I, §8.
44. A further statement indicates the majority was thinking in terms of discovering
the basis of the parties' claims in bankruptcy. Referring to one possible categorization
of the local law, it said: "It is still the difference between finding out what the contract
claim is as opposed to adjusting priorities among unascertained claims." Geist v. Pru-
dence Realization Corp., 122 IF. (2d) 503, 506 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
NOTES1941]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
find their "real basis" in the certificates held, with the guaranty contract an
ancillary agreement binding only its signers and of no consequence in the
relationship of either to the mortgagor.45 Hence, it would appear that the
court should isolate the problem of discovering the basis for the bankruptcy
claims from the problem of the enforceability of the collateral priority con-
tract. If that practice is adopted, the bankruptcy court, instead of finding
the "real basis" of the claims in the priority contract as indicated in the
majority opinion, would then follow the preferable procedure of considering
the foundation of the claims before deciding upon their order of payment.
It would seem that the bankruptcy courts would afford greater protection
to public investment in mortgage participation certificates by rejecting the
New York presumption where the guarantor is insolvent, and adopting one
of equality of participation for all holdings in the particular issue,1 If
accepted principles of bankruptcy administration are followed, the guarantor's
claim will be subordinated only upon clear expression of intent by the con-
tracting parties.
UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX: DIVIDENDS-PAID CREDIT
IN TAX-FREE INTERCORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS*
THaE Revenue Act of 19361 imposed upon all corporations subject to income
tax a "surtax upon undistributed profits."' 2 The history of the tax suggests
that it was looked upon not only as a means of tapping sources of federal
revenue theretofore lightly taxed but also as a measure of reform, in that
it met the economists' argument that excessive corporate saving was a con-
tributing cause of the depression.3 A natural tax consequence of this saving
45. In re Rodewald, 24 F. Supp. 905 (S. D. Ill. 1938). A guaranty creditor does not
thereby become a "secured creditor" in the principal's bankruptcy proceeding. Swars
v. 4th Nat. Bank of St. Louis, 117 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) ; accord, In re Noyes Bros.,
127 Fed. 286 (C. C. A. 1st, 1903).
46. For a similar view of the state litigation, see (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 480; (1940)
14 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 424.
* Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp., 122 F. (2d) 361 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941), cert.
granted, 10 U. S. L. WEK 3176 (U. S. 1941).
1. 49 STAT. 1648 (1936).
2. Section 14. The surtax was included in the Revenue Act of 1938 but at
much lower rates; it was allowed to lapse with the Act of 1939.
3. See generally BUEHLER, THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITs TAX (1937). On the
history of this type of tax, see Martin, Taxation of Undisiributed Corporate Profits
(1936) 35 MIcH. L. REV. 44; Comments (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 1321, (1936) 50 H.Iv.
L. REV. 332. The legislative hearings and reports are of little use in pursuing the
wraith of Congressional intent. The surtax was originally proposed by the House as
a substitute for all other corporate taxes; the Senate amended the House Bill and
reintroduced the existing tax structure with an undistributed profits tax added. "The
Conference Committee had the difficult task of reconciling . . . two diverse bills
actuated by divergent views as to the proper attitude toward corporate wealth ....
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was that tax assessments for individuals in the higher brackets were sub-
stantially lowered, since profits allowed to remain in a corporation were
subject only to a relatively low rate of tax.4 This revenue loss was aggra-
vated through conscious manipulation by taxpayers who controlled closely
held corporations.
The 1936 surtax was not the first attempt to tax profits retained by
corporations. Since 1918 the Revenue Acts have included provisions im-
posing a penalty tax on corporations "improperly accumulating surplus."*'
These provisions have, however, been difficult to administer 0 and have failed
to check the increasing use of the corporate form as a means of tax avoid-
ance.7 Consequently," in 1934 Congress imposed a heavy tax on "undis-
tributed profits" of personal holding companies without regard to the
propriety of the accumulation. 9 In 1936 this tax was extended to all cor-
porations.10
The old penalty tax on improperly accumulated surplus had been imposed
on the entire net income of the offending corporation. The 1934 personal
The House and Senate 1936 Bills were dissimilar in general aim, theory and in
structure. The 1936 Act as finally enacted was to a considerable extent written in
conference without any new statement of legislative intent-a fact which contributes
in no small measure to the difficulty of interpretation of the Act." ME.r,.s, Tan
LAw oF FEDERAL I.NcO mE TAXATiON (1939 Cum. Supp.) 1397.
4. Under the Revenue Act of 1936 the tax rate on corporate incomes (apart from
the surtax on undistributed profits) ranged up to 15% on corporate income over
$40,000. § 13. Individual surtax rates went as high as 75q. § 12.
5. Revenue Act of 1918, § 220. INrT. REv. CODE § 102 (1939). Another forerunner
of the 1936 surtax is found in § 1206(2) of the Revenue Act of 1917 (40 STAT. 300,
334) which imposed a 10% tax on undistributed corporate profits where the income
retained was not for actual employment in the reasonable needs of the business.
6. In suits brought under this section the Government must show not only that
there has been an improper or unreasonable accumulation of surplus, but also that
there has been a purpose to avoid individual surtax on the stockholders. United Business
Corp. v. Commissioner, 62 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
7. See Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Comnpany Proazisios of the
Intenzal Revenue Code (1939) 49 Y.AE L. J. 171, 217-21. Rudick lists a total of
thirty cases brought under Section 102, seventeen of which were won by the Govern-
ment. After repeal of the surtax on undistributed profits, the Treasury indicated that
corporate returns beginning with 1938 would be closely e.,amined with a view to
uncovering violations of Section 102. See T. D. 4914, 1939-2 Cu3x. Buu.. 103. It was
suggested that the purpose of the proposed "drive" was to demonstrate once and for
all the ineffectiveness of Section 102 and thus prepare the way for a reenactment of
the general tax on undistributed profits. See Halperin, T. D. 4914 and the Sturtax on
Corporations Improperly Accumulating Surplus (1940) 18 TAXES 72. Whatever the
reason, reports of the Board of Tax Appeals during 1941 have shown a substantial
increase in cases brought under the section.
8. H. R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; 1939-1 Crm. Bun. (Pt. 2) 562.
9. Revenue Act of 1934, § 351.
10. The Act of 1936 retained the tax on improperly accumulated surplus (§ 102)
as well as the personal holding company tax (§351). Payment of the surtax under
Section 14 did not relieve the corporate taxpayer from liability under the other sections.
See XV-2 CuM. Bum- 72 (1935).
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holding company tax introduced the new device of a credit for dividends
paid,"' which were to be deducted from corporate net income, and the
remainder only taxed. This credit became the central feature of the undis-
tributed profits tax. Section 27 was added to define when the credit was
allowable.
12
Section 27(f)' 3 provided that amounts distributed in liquidation should,
insofar as they were "properly chargeable to the earnings or profits accu-
mulated since February 28, 1913," be treated as "taxable dividends paid"
in computing the dividends-paid credit. Without this provision the Act
would have led to an ingenious but inequitable paradox under which a
corporation having paid out in liquidation all its assets including all its
profits would still have been subject to the surtax on profits that were at
best only metaphysically "undistributed."'14 This result would follow from
the rule that corporate distributions in liquidation are not statutory dividends
but a return of capital investment, and are taxable only as capital gains.16
Since the credit was allowed only for "dividends," it was necessary to turn
liquidating distributions into "dividends" for the purpose of Section 27.
As the section was drafted, however, it automatically created two problems
which were bound to provoke litigation."6
11. Revenue Act of 1934, §351(b)(2)(C).
12. The general undistributed profits tax was discontinued in 1939. Section 27
of the Internal Revenue Code now applies to the surviving undistributed profits taxcs
levied on personal holding companies (§500), foreign personal holding companies
(§ 331 et seq.) and on improper accumulation of surplus (§ 102).
13. Now INT. Rxv. CODE §27(g) (1939).
14. Cf. Foley Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 1036 (1938), aff'd,
106 F. (2d) 731 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), where the A Corporation had an operating
deficit at the beginning of the taxable year, and income during the taxable year greater
than the pre-existing deficit. It thereafter distributed to its stockholders almost its
entire taxable income. The court held that a dividends-paid credit should be allowed
only for that part of the distribution in excess of the deficit; for the balance the A
Corporation was liable to surtax as on "undistributed profits." This case was brought
under Section 351 of the Revenue Act of 1934. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit recently refused to follow the Foley case in Pembroke Realty and Securities Co. v.
Commissioner, 122 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). But the Board subsequently
fol!owed the rule in the Foley case in Saxon Trading Corp., 45 B. T. A. 16 (1941).
15. INT. REV. CODE § 115(a) (1939): "The term 'dividend' . . . means any dis-
tribution made by a corporation to its shareholders . . . (1) out of its earnings or
profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of the earnings or profits
of the taxable year . . ." § 115c) : "Amounts distributed in complete liquidation
of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock, and
amounts distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in part
or full payment for the stock." Hellmich v. Hellman, 276 U. S. 233 (1928); M. E.
Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U. S. 267 (1938) ; see White v. United States, 305 U, S.
281, 288 (1938). See Darnell, Corporate Liquidations and the Federal Income Tax
(1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 907; Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1146; MAILL,
TAXABLE INCOME (1939) 114-15.
16. Darnell, Corporate Liquidations and the Federal Income Tax (1941) 89 U. or
PA. L. REV. 907, 927, n. 106. Commentators were quick to point out the statutory
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The first problem involves the limitation of the credit to that part of the
distribution "properly chargeable to earnings or profits. . " "Earnings
or profits" is a chameleon phrase which has more than one meaning in
income taxation. 17 In some sections of the Revenue Acts' 8 it has been
interpreted to mean earned surplus as distinguished from capital accounts.10
In its second, more technical meaning, the phrase connotes something differ-
ent from corporate "net income." Thus elements of income not taxable to
corporations as "income" may still be "earnings or profits," on distribution
of which shareholders are taxed, under the statutory definition of a "divi-
dend." 20  Furthermore, a line of cases beginning with Commissioncr v.
Sansome2l established the rule that in certain tax-free corporate reorganiza-
tions, where one corporation distributed its assets to a successor, the earnings
or profits of the first corporation were not distributed but passed intact to
the successor in interest, and, when distributed to the shareholders of the
second corporation, were still statutory dividends subject to tax as such.
The 1936 Act codified this rule to some extent in Section 115(h) :
"The distribution . . . to a distributee by or on behalf of a cor-
poration of its stock or securities or stock or securities in another
corporation shall not be considered a distribution of earnings or
profits of any corporation . . .
(1) if no gain to such distributee from the receipt of such stock
or securities was recognized by law . .
Under these circumstances the question may be raised whether distributions
in a tax-free liquidation should be held "properly chargeable to earnings
or profits."
discrepancies which emerged. See inter alia Klein, Liquidations under the R-ennr,
Act of 1936 (1936) 14 TAXES 648, 650; Seidman, The Undistributed Profits Tax-
Suggested Changes in Law (1937) 15 TmxEs 79, 82; Seidman, Some Problcins Ewcrg-
ing from Tax-Free Intercorporate Liquidations under the 1936 Federal Income Tax
Act (1936) 6 BRooKLYN L. REv. 199, 206; Comments (1936) 36 CoL L RE-v. 1321,
1332, (1936) 50 HARv. L. RPv. 332, 339; MERTENS, LAw op Fm A. Ico!.= TAxATz0.;
(1939 Cure. Supp.) 1436, n. 93. -Nevertheless, Congress has continued to reenact the
sections involved in the problem in identical form.
17. See generally Paul, Ascertainmnt of "Earmings or Profits" (1937) 51 HAniv.
L. REv. 40. Reprinted in PAUL, SELECE:D S=tiDms in" FEDmAL TAXA0tIo (2d Ser.)
(1938).
18. E.g., INT. REv. CODE §§ 113(b) (1) (D), 115(c), 115(g) (1939).
19. See Credit Alliance Corp., 42 B. T. A. 1020, 1027 (1940).
20. Charles F. Ayer, 12 B. T. A. 284 (1928). This was decided under the Revenue
Act of 1921, but is "generally applicable under existing law." Paul, stupra note 17,
at 44.
21. 60 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 667 (1932);
United States v. Kauffman, 62 F. (2d) 1045 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Murchison's Estate
v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 641 (C. C.A. 5th, 1935); Fain v. Commissioner, 76 F.
(2d) 1008 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 588 (1935); Harter v. Helver-
ing, 79 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Baker v. Commissioner, 80 F. (2d) 813
(C. C.A. 2d, 1936).
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The second problem concerning the credit arises from subdivision (1h)
of Section 27.22 This provision states a general exception to the dividends-
paid credit by providing that it be disallowed where any part of a distri-
bution is "not a taxable dividend in the hands of . . . the stockholders."
Furthermore, Section 112(b) (6) provides with elaborate detail for the tax-
free liquidation of a subsidiary corporation into its parent.2 3 The three
sections of the Act, by interrelation, seemed to result in contradictory im-
peratives: in a 112(b)(6) liquidation the credit is as clearly allowed by
27(f) as it is prohibited by 27(h).24
The problem has now received three hearings in different circuit courts of
appeals. The Fifth Circuit ruled on the issue first in Centennial Oil Company
v. Thoa,=. 25 It affirmed the District Court's holding that the subsidiary,
liquidated under the provisions of 112(b) (6), was not entitled to the divi-
dends-paid credit in any amount. The ground of decision was briefly stated
to be that Section 27(h) limited Section 27(f) by way of exception. The
court did not discuss the further problem presented by "properly, chargeable
to earnings or profits."' 26 The same issue came before the Board of Tax
Appeals in Credit Alliance Corporation .2  The Board expressly refused to
follow the Centennial Oil decision and allowed the credit. In the past year
the Board has followed the Credit Alliance rule in a dozen other cases., s
22. INT. REV. CODE § 27(i) (1939).
23. To qualify under Section 112(b)(6) the distributee must have owned at least
80% of voting and non-voting (except where limited and preferred as to dividends)
stock at the date of adoption of a plan of liquidation, must own at least 80% at the
date of receipt of the property, and may not dispose of any stock between the date
of adoption of a plan and the date of receipt of the property. The section also specifies
the time within which the liquidation must be completed.
24. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94 Art. 27(f)-i ruled that the dividends-paid creiit was
denied the distributing corporation in a 112(b) (6) liquidation.
25. 109 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) (Hutcheson, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
309 U. S. 690 (1940).
26. The court indicated its conception of the function of 27(f) in these word,.:
"The philosophy of Subsection 27(f) is that in ordinary liquidations where there are
accumulated profits, the profits could first be declared as a dividend and afterwards
the remaining assets distributed in liquidation; and when both things are done in one
transaction the same results shall be allowed to follow. The purpose of the undis-
tributed profits surtax is to force distribution of profits to the stockholders so they
may be taxed as dividends in the stockholders' hands." 109 F. (2d) 359, 360 (C. C. A.
5th, 1940).
27. 42 B. T. A. 1020 (1940). Two members dissented on the authority of the
Centennial Oil case.
28. Kay Manufacturing Corp., 42 B. T. A. 1480 (1940) (mem); Lane-Wells Co.,
43 B. T. A. 463 (1941); Crown-Zellerbach Corp., 43 B. T. A. 541 (1941); California
Brewing Ass'n, 43 B. T. A. 721 (1941) ; Little Gem Coal Co., 44 B. T. A. 755 (1941);
Oliver Ditson Co., Inc., 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. if 7081-E (B. T. A. nmcin.) ;
Desmond's Co., 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 7083-E (B. T. A. mem.) ; O'Donnell
Oil & Securities Co., 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. f17083-F (B. T. A. meni.);
Asheville Citizen-Times Co., 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ij 7083-G (B. T. A. mer,);
Biltmore Co., Transferee, 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. Ij 7083-H (B. T. A. mern.) ;
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently affirmed the Board's
position in Helvcring v. Credit Alliance Corporation,20 and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has also sustained it in Helvcring v. Kay Man-
facturing Corporation.30
The Board's first argument in the Credit Alliance case follows the canon
of statutory construction requiring that a more specific statutory provision
override a more general one in case of conflict. Since Section 27(1h) relates
to all distributions and Section 27(f) only to those in liquidation, the latter
should govern. 31 The Board also holds that allowing the credit carries out
the Congressional policy expressed in the tax-free liquidation provisions of
Section 112(b)(6). If the liquidation were to subject the subsidiary to the
undistributed profits tax, Congressional intent would be thwarted. The Board
then answers the argument that, even if the tax-free liquidation aspect of the
transaction does not defeat the credit, the distribution is not "properly
chargeable to earnings and profits" because of Section 115(h). That section,
as it appeared in the 1936 Act,32 related only to distributions by a corporation
of "stock or securities"; in a 112(b) (6) liquidation the subsidiary dis-
tributes not "stock or securities" but all its assets, tangible and intangible.
Therefore Section 115(h) seems inapplicable. Finally, the phrase "earnings
or profits" as used in Section 27(f) must be taken to mean merely earned
surplus as distinguished from paid-in surplus and other capital accounts.p
Hughes Tool Co., 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. I 7646-C (B. T. A. niem.) ; Western
Cartridge Co., 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 17654-B (B. T. A. mem.); Lencul
Corp., 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 1,7663-D (B. T. A. mom.); Central State,
Collieries, Inc., 3 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 1 7oti3-E (B. T. A. mem.).
Reed Drug Co., 44 B.T.A. 573 (1941) (distinguishing Credit Alliaince Corp.;
two members dissenting). See also Great Lakes Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 3 C. C. H.
1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 7437-A (B. T. A. mem.). In Little Gem Coal Co., 44 B. T. A.
755 (1941), the Reed case was strictly limited to its own facts, and, it v;was stated, "can-
not be considered as impairing the authority of Credit Alliance Corp:'
29. 122 F. (2d) 361 (C. C.A. 4th, 1941).
30. 122 F. (2d) 443 (C. C.A. 2d, 1941).
31. The Board had previously held that 27(f) vas limited by 27(g) which denied
the credit in cases where the distributions were preferential. lMay Hosiery Mills, Inc.,
42 B. T. A. 646 (1940), aff d. 2 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. 19571 (C. C. A. 4th,
1941) (Credit Alliance filed a brief anieus curiae).
32. The Revenue Act of 1938 added the words "or of property or money" after
the phrase "or stock or securities in another corporation" to § 115(h). The Board in
the instant case, as well as the Second and Fourth Circuit Courts, reserved opinion on
the result which would follow from this wording of the statute, and rejected the Govern-
ments argument that the insertion in the 1938 Act was merely a clarification and nut
an extension of the earlier form.
33. The Board rejected the further argument made by the Government that the
Treasury Regulation (U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 27(f)-i) had been tacitly approved by
Congress through reenactment of the sections in successive Revenue Acts. The Board
stated that reenactment was entitled to little weight in the case of a tax which w-as shortly
thereafter repealed. It is true that the undistributed profits tax was repealed; on the other
hand Sections 27(f), 27(h), and 112(b) (6) remain in the Code. The fiction of Congres-
sional approval by reenactment is best disregarded. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
1941]
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The opinions in the circuit courts of appeals add little to the arguments
of the Board. Both opinions exclude the Board's demonstration on the logical
level and stress the argument of Congressional policy. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals suggests that the statutory conflict could be eliminated
by holding the parent-distributee liable for the undistributed profits surtax
if it did not thereafter distribute them to its stockholders.2 4 This apparently
gratuitous dictum, though a sensible and equitable solution to the whole
problem, unfortunately finds no support in the statute.3,
In the Credit Alliance case neither the Board nor the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals is wholly convincing in the attempt to demonstrate that
statutory dissonance gives way to an inner harmony upon correct construc-
tion. The corpus of our income tax law has become so unwieldy that, more
and more frequently, instances will occur where several sections clash. In
such cases the solution must come from interstitial legislation by the courts;
decision for the taxpayer or decision for the Government may be equally
plausible under the language of the applicable sections of the Act. The
court's conception of policy, though phrased in terms of a hypothetically
discoverable Congressional intent, must dictate the decision actually arrived at.
Section 112 as a whole defines various types of corporate reorganization
in which no gain or loss is "recognized." These provisions2 a are, strictly,
tax-deferring rather than tax-exempting, since on final liquidation of the
enterprise the stockholders are subject to a capital gains tax on the amount
by which the liquidating distributions exceed the basis of the stock.81 The
reorganization sections, as construed, apply in cases where business exigencies
require modification of corporate structure, and where a continuity of interest
in the enterprise persists.38  Section 112(b) (6) was new legislation in the
Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939), seemed to lay down the rule that a regulation became binding
when the section it construed was reenacted, but in Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308
U. S. 90 (1939), the rule was promptly avoided. For recent discussion see Brown, Regu-
lations, Reenactment and the Revenue Acts (1941) 54 HARv. L. Rav. 377; Feller, Adden-
dumn to the Regulations Problem (1941) 54 HARV. L. Rv. 1311; Griswold, A Summary
of the Regulations Problem (1941) 54 HAR V. L. REv. 398.
34. Helvering v. Credit Alliance Corp., 122 F. (2d) 361, 365 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
35. See discussion infra pp. 329-30.
36. Described as unbelievably complicated in PAUL, STuns IN FEDER~AL TAxATIo
(3d Ser.) (1940) 4.
37. Id. at 53-54.
38. The Supreme Court ruled in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935),
that a literal compliance with the provisions of Section 112 was not enough to avoid
the capital gains tax where an intent to avoid tax was discoverable. The Treasury
regulations have codified the point decided in the Gregory case. "The Code recognizes
as a reorganization the change (made in a specific way) from a business enterprise
conducted by a single corporation to the same business enterprise conducted by a parent
and a subsidiary corporation but not the creation of a temporary subsidiary as a device
for the making of an ordinary dividend." (U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 112(g)-i;
id. 103, § 19.112(g)-i). A recent case holding that for the purposes of the reorganiza-
tion section a complicated intercorporate shuffle must be viewed as a whole, dis-
regarding the "intermediate prestidigitation" is Morgan v. Helvering, 117 F. (2d) 334
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941) (per L. Hand, J.). "Unlike the transfer of property to a cor-
poration upon its formation the reverse process of liquidation has received the legis-
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1936 Act, and its insertion in the reorganization chapter undoubtedly mani-
fests Congressional intent to encourage corporate simplification by eliminating
the capital gains tax in situations where the enterprise as a whole continues.
There is no persuasive reason for presuming that Congress intended to
confer any other and greater benefit, i.e., exemption of current earnings
transferred from undistributed profits surtax.
In some situations it may be desirable for the enterprise to liquidate so as
not to come under the provisions of Section 112(b) (6). In such a tax-free
liquidation the basis of the property received is "the same as it would be
in the hands of the transferor."30 Where the cost of tie assets to the
subsidiary is less than the cost of the subsidiary's stock to the parent, so
that on a taxable liquidation the parent would obtain as basis what it had
paid for the stock, then liquidation will be so effected as not to fall within
112(b) (6). The capital gains tax paid on the liquidation may be offset
not only by the stepped-up basis to the parent but by avoidance of the tax
on domestic corporate dividends received.40
The result of this basis provision is to make 112(b) (6) liquidations un-
available for purposes of tax-exemption as distinguished from tax-deferment
-for if the parent achieves a stepped-up basis on a tax-free liquidation,
then the increment arising from the shift to the new basis becomes tax-free
on final liquidation of the enterprise. The Credit Alliance rule has the effect
of granting an exemption from undistributed profits surtax (insofar as
current earnings are transferred) analogous to the exemption denied by the
basis provision. It can be plausibly argued that the benefit intended to be
conferred by Section 112(b) (6) is deferment only; the linking of 112(b) (6)
with the basis provision indicates that the liquidation section should not be
construed to exempt the property transferred from all tax. The conclusion
is that the policy exemplified in Section 112(b) (6) will not square with
the exemption from surtax of the current earnings transferred.
This argument falls if, as suggested by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, these earnings are subject to surtax in the hands of the
distributee.41 But for them to be so taxable, they must become a part of
the gross income of the parent-distributee, since the computation of undis-
tributed profits surtax is based on the statutory net income of the taxpayer.A2
lative blessing of tax exemption most sparingly." Darnell, Corporate Liq idations
and the Income Tax (1941) 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 907. There are, however, cases
implying that the reorganization provisions are to be liberally construed. See, e.g.9,
Commissioner v. Dana, 103 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
39. IxT. REv. CODE § 113(a) (15) (1939). The provision in the 1936 Act was
identical.
40. See Seidman, Sonc Problems Emerging from Tax-Free Intercorporate Liqtdda-
tions under the 1936 Federal Income Tax Act (1936) 6 Boo=D iir L. Rxv. 199;
2 C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. f1733.05, 780.01; Johnson, Tax-Frec Liquidation:
Loophole and Trap (1937) 15 TxEs 3; Klein, Liquidations undcr the Reventue Act
of 1936 (1936) 14 TAX.Es 648.
41. See note 34 supra and parallel text.
42. Net income is defined as "the gross income computed under §22, less the
deductions allowed by § 23." INT. REv. CODE § 21 (1939). The surtax on undistributed
19411
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Gross income includes "gains . . derived from any source whatever"
41
and, on distributions in liquidation, the gain is determined by the excess
over the stockholder's basis. 44 But this gain "shall be recognized only to the
extent provided in Section 112." Since in a 112(b) (6) liquidation no gain
is recognized, there is no income to the distributee and therefore nothing
on which the surtax may be imposed. In cases of liquidations not falling
within Section 112(b) (6), where gain is recognized, it is easy to agree with
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that "there is nothing in the
Act which says that the distributee is not subject to tax upon undistributed
profits if it persists in the retention . . . of undivided profits.1' 45 But the
question does not arise, since, in a taxable liquidation, the credit is obviously
available to the liquidating subsidiary under Section 27(f).
Treasury regulations issued under Section 27(f) establish a locus
penitentiae by ruling that if, in a 112(b)(6) liquidation, the parent-dis-
tributee paid to its stockholders before the end of the taxable year the
earnings or profits received from the subsidiary, the dividends-paid credit
would be allowed. 46 Although this interpretation clearly tends to effectuate
the purpose of the Act, it may nevertheless rest on a doubtful statutory
foundation. The rulings seem to have been based on the provision of Section
115(h) that earnings and profits of the subsidiary are not distributed in a
112(b) (6) liquidation but pass intact to the distributee. Both the Second
and the Fourth Circuit Courts have interpreted the provision, as it appears
in the 1936 Act, not to support the Government's contention that the liquid-
ating distributions are not "properly chargeable to earnings or profits."
But, quite apart from the applicability of Section 115(h), the ruling
seems incorrect. If the parent can receive a credit on distribution of the
subsidiary's transferred earnings, it must be taxable when they are not
distributed. But whether or not the earnings "pass intact," they do not be-
come income to the parent and therefore do not become taxable to it. The
Sansome case, codified in Section 115(h), 47 holds that the earnings or
profits, retaining their character on a tax-free reorganization, are still within
the statutory definition of dividends when ultimately distributed to stock-
holders of the reorganized corporation. The theory has nothing to do with
the question of whether or not the earnings or profits are "income" to the
successor corporation. The Treasury ruling is the converse of the suggestion
profits (§ 14 Revenue Act of 1936) defined "adjusted net income" as net income minus
normal tax (§ 13) and various other credits, and "undistributed net income" as adjusted
net income minus the dividends paid credit (§ 27). The surtax was levied on the net
income. The amount of the tax was determined by the ratio between "undistributed"
and "adjusted" net income.
43. INT. REv. CoDE §22(a) (1939).
44. Section 115(c) Revenue Act of 1936: "The gain or loss . . . shall be deter-
mined under Section 111, but shall be recognized only to the extent provided in
Section 112." § 111 (a) : "The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall
be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis . .
45. 122 F. (2d) 361, 365 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
46. U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 27(f)-i.
47. See Comment (1936) 36 COL L. REv. 1321, 1337.
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that the distributee be taxed, if the subsidiary is allowed the credit. The
same principles apply in both cases.
In Helvcring v. Kay Manufacturing Corporation the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, discussing the relationship between Sections 27(f) and
27(h) stated:
"Having made this specific provision in favor of the liquidating
corporation, it would be strange indeed if Congress intended to
withdraw by paragraph (h) the benefit just granted by paragraph
(f). . . . To read those words in paragraph (h) as modifying
the language of paragraph (f) would deprive the latter of all
utility."
In this connection it may be noted that Section 27(f) refers to all distri-
butions in liquidation, complete and partial, not merely to the highly restricted
type of 112(b) (6). Even if the credit is denied to the corporation liquidating
under 112(b)(6), the section retains its utility and confers its benefit in all
other liquidations. The purpose of 27(f) is realized if the section is held
applicable where there has in fact been a taxable distribution of profits to
stockholders outside the enterprise, and inapplicable where the tax on the
distributions is avoided.
If one accepts the canon of construction followed by the Board, the credit
should be allowed. In the realm of policy the court must weigh the Govern-
ment's increasing need for revenue and the purpose of the undistributed
profits surtax against an announced objective of encouraging certain business
transactions. It is submitted that the reasons for denying the credit outweigh
the reasons for allowing it.
RIGHTS OF WORKMEN AGAINST UNION OFFICIALS
DURING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS
THE legal duties owed to workers by trade union officials in collective
bargaining have remained undefined. The development of trade unions has
created some institutional protection over the terms and tenure of employ-
ment ;1 but any individual worker must still rely on imperfectly controlled
union leaders. 2 A share in job regulation should place upon union officers
the responsibility of representing the interests of all employees in good faith.
1. Guild and state regulations have provided some protection for most previous gen-
erations of industrial craftsmen. The factory workman, without alternative sources 4
income or any guarantees of his livelihood, appeared in the nineteenth century industrial
development. Thus trade unionism has reestablished, in a different form, the manual
worker's former control over the terms of his employment. See Ftesz -,i: A;D 1Int'u-,
A Srpvz- OF EUROPEAN CIvI\zTIrox (193b) 252-53; Hxmm4uwrm A';t Hm'i #'.t, THE
Towx L.oRER (2d ed. 1925) c. 2.
2. Apathy among the members and the practical necessity of retaining e.lperienced
bargainers inevitably limit any popular control of union officials. See WDUu Amo WEBB,
ImiusTRA L DE-mocc (2d ed. 1902) Pt. I, cc. 1 & 2; IEDnD AND \\Wn, Hs-w"a L-"
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Yet, occasionally in any union the bargaining representatives may refuse to
enforce equal treatment at work or reinstatement, or they may secure a
discharge, for reasons which are entirely personal. And in some industries,
such as building construction and food markets, where the labor supply is
not normally attached to a single employer or is needed for immediate work
on perishable commodities, the increased power of the union leaders con-
trolling that labor supply has invited extensive corruption and tyranny.0
Yet, widespread fear of the long-term effects of judicial intervention, to-
gether with the natural reluctance of the courts to interfere with intra-union
affairs, 4 has hindered the establishment of adequate remedies for workmen
against a union and its officials."
The courts have adopted various legal concepts to describe the relation-
ship between workers and the union officials engaged in bargaining with
their employer. Two leading theories have developed from the attempted
enforcement of collective agreements. Union leaders act as agents and usually
need a specific authorization to bind their members to contracts with em-
ployers; 6 yet, the members and other workmen may sue as third party
beneficiaries to enforce such agreements against the employer.7 Intra-union
disputes have developed several other rationales. A contract between member
and un'on to follow all union rules has often been spelled out, largely for
the purpose of protecting benefit rights and job tenure against arbitrary
TRADE UNIONISMf (2d ed. 1920) 444-71; HomE, TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNrITD STATES
(2d ed. 1923) c. 7.
3. In the extended discussions about corruption in American trade unions, this con-
centration in a few unions has been generally overlooked. See SFIDMAN, LABOR CZARS
(1938).
4. In part judicial laissez-faire has probably been based upon a desire to avoid a
controversial problem. But full autonomy has traditionally been thought necessary to
allow voluntary unincorporated associations to carry out their own purposes, and under
this theory trade unions have been handled as if they were religious associations or ex-
clusive clubs. A striking example of the policy is found in Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass.
159, 176 N. E. 791 (1931), where the court refused to correct an obvious error which
had been made in good faith. See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations
Not for Profit (1930) 43 HAzv. L. REv. 993.
5. Judicial intervention to correct abuses of trade union power is well established
in cases involving expulsion of members from the union, and scattered decisions have
given redress against racketeers and against violations of civil liberties. The best re-
view of the subject is found in Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 1248. Remedies to pro-
tect workmen can be given by injunction or damages. The choice between the union and
the officials as defendants is not of primary importance: legally their duties will usually
coincide, and in fact the union treasury will make most payments.
6. Ahlquist v. Alaska-Portland Packers' Ass'n, 39 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 9th,
1930) ; A. R. Barnes and Co. v. Berry, 169 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909), aff'g 157 Fed.
883 (S. D. Ohio 1908). See note 13 infra. This requirement of authorization depends
on a construction of the union rules in each case.
7. Yazoo and Miss. Val. R. R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931), is a
leading case. The various rationales employed in this situation are reviewed in Rent-
schler v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N. W. 694 (1934), 95 A. L. R, 1, 10
(1935) ; see also Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48 YALE
L. J. 195.
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expulsions from the union s Further control over the officials has been rarely
provided on the analogy of corporate stockholders' suits.0  More important
is the extension, to protect workmen against unjustified union interference,
of the inalienable rights guaranteed by the Constitution: free speech, 0 a
fair hearing before expulsion," and free access to work offered.' 2 These
rights implied by law are more easily adapted to a new situation than those
based on supposed private agreements.
Collective bargaining by union officials for their members readily suggests
the agency analogy, and the agent's duties of good faith and obedience have
often provided the means of enforcing obligations of union leaders 3 Yet,
the protection of workmen under an agency rationale is incomplete and
easily abused. The union officials' negotiations as agents could not create
8. The contract rationale is most explicitly developed in Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc.
601, 122 N. Y. Supp. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910). Since this theory could provide redress only
where there has been some defect in following the procedure prescribed by the union
rules, constitutional guarantees were soon invoked to provide protection fur the %vorker's
rights where the union rules did not do so. See notes 10-12 infra. But the contract
rationale is still constantly repeated as the basic theory of intra-union rights, and the
occasional enforcement of contractual rights sometimes produces serious difficulties.
See note 17 infra.
9. The problem of limiting ultra vires activities of union officials has not been
seriously explored. A famous series of English cases has forbidden appropriation nf
the union's funds to unauthorized purposes; the most important is Osborne v. Amalga-
mated Society of Railway Servants, [1910] A. C. 87. The argument is completely de-
molished in INEBB AND WVEBB, HISTORY Or TRAuE UNIohzism (2d eI. 1920) 6W-31.
10. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 Ad. 70 (1921), holding that a
union cannot expel a member for signing a petition opposing the union's legislative pro-
gram. See Witmer, Civil Liberties and the Trade Union (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 621.
11. Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N. Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1919), 'here a
rule providing for trial and expulsion without a hearing was held invalid; accord, Yc:kel
v. German-American Bund, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 774 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
12. Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 152, 112 N. E. 853 (1916) (against a jurisdictiunal
strike). See also Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 91, 94, 56 At. 327, 331, 333 (1903)
(against a jurisdictional strike); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 1,7 Mass. 92, 4i7, 44 N. E. 1077
(1896) (against picketing).
13. In at least one important instance the annulment of an agreement as unauthor-
ized by the membership has brought collective negotiations closer to popular control. In
1906-07, during the Typographical Union's long struggle for the eight-hour day and
against the open shop, a popular rebellion in the Pressmen's Union brought to power a
more militant group led by George L. Berry, pledged to carry out a similar program. A
compromise agreement, signed by the former officials of the Pressmen, v,as denied sv:-
cific performance in court as unauthorized by the members. A. R. Barnes and Co. v.
Berry, 157 Fed. 833 (S. D. Ohio 1908), aff'd, 169 Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 6th, 1DJ); see
PERLMAN AND TAFT, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATS 1896-1932 (1935) 59.
The requirement of specific authorization under the agency analogy has also serv .e
to define and limit the liability of the members for torts committed by the union officers.
Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522 (1915) ; Sweetman v. Barrov.s, 263 Mass. 349, lA N.
E. 272 (1928).
Under the analogous notion of a fiduciary duty owed by the uniun officials to the
members, a receivership has been set up in a few cases to oust racketeers fron control
of local unions. See for example Chalghian v. Int. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 114 N. J.
Eq. 497, 169 Atl. 327 (Ch. 1933).
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any rights for non-unionists, nor perhaps for those members who voted
against authorizing the agreement, against either employers or the officials
themselves. In the enforcement of collective agreements against employers,
the agency theory has been abandoned by the courts because of this failure
to provide redress for all employees.1 4 The same limitation on the safeguards
provided by the officers' duties as agents in collective bargaining would
exclude many workmen in particular need of protection. In Young 7).
Canadian Northern Railway Company,'i for example, a collective agreement
provided standard terms for "employees"; but the majority union's officials
refused to enforce the seniority rights listed for a member of a rival minority
union. A more serious disadvantage to the agency rationale in trade union
affairs lies in the fact that many authorizations to the officials are never
meant seriously as binding instructions. In the informal proceedings of union
meetings resolutions promising support are often passed hurriedly and with-
out any real consideration. Even in a vote to strike, the purpose may be
to strengthen the bargainers' hand and precipitate a showdown. 10 Union
officials are not employees, but leaders with a wide discretion. judicial
enforcement of any apparent instructions affords hostile judges an oppor-
tunity to intervene at the instance of minorities under employer influence
and curtail an official's needed freedom of action. The incomplete protec-
tion whichi the agency rationale gives to union members does not justify
such a threat to a union's legitimate activities.
Three other traditional business categories are even less appropriate for
regulating intra-union affairs. The usual contract implied between a union
and its members provides protection only for those union members who
are injured by the official's clear violation of a written rule. Any extension
of implied contractual relations within a union would involve the creation
of inflexible duties derived from informal agreements.' 7 The workers' even-
tual status as third party beneficiaries, after the collective agreement is signed,
does not establish a duty of good faith upon the officials as promisees during
negotiations. The corporate analogy offers redress against delinquent officers
only for injuries to the whole union. In short, all analogies derived from
business relations must be unrealistic when applied to trade unions, because
each assumes a well-defined private agreement.
14. See note 7 supra. But see Mueller v. Chicago and North Western Ry., 194 Minn.
83, 259 N. W. 798 (1935).
15. [1929] 4 D. L. R. 452 (Man. K. B.), [1930] 3 D. L. R. 352 (MaIn. C. A.),
[1931] A. C. 83 (P. C.).
16. The courts have properly refused to pass on the legal significance of a strike
vote. See Burke v. Monumental Division, 273 Fed. 707 (D. Md. 1919), and Burke v.
Monumental Division, 286 Fed. 949 (D. Md. 1922), aff'd, 298 Fed. 1019 (C. C. A. 4th,
1924), rev'd, 270 U. S. 629 (1926).
17. When local unions have shifted their national affiliation, the contractual enforce-
ment of the first national's rule against dissolving a local has produced an extraordinary
situation: the new C. I. 0. local has almost all the members, and the old A. F. of L.
local is left with nothing but funds and a valid closed shop contract. M and M Wood
Working Co. v. NLRB, 101 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); Lumber and Sawmill




On the other hand, the creation of new duties between strangers permits
a flexible adaptation to the needs of the collective bargaining situation. The
original tort duty to preserve the physical security of limb and land has
expanded rapidly to safeguard the enjoyment of intangibles, especially con-
tractual relations in modem business. Similarly, for the manual worker
an undisturbed access to existing work has been guaranteed- on the con-
stitutional level,' 8 or under the property label, or simply as a vested rela-
tionship." - Constitutional guarantees could hardly be invoked directly to
justify judicial supervision of the usual processes of collective bargaining.2 0
But any employment relationship is protected under tort law from "malicious"
interference. 2' With the widespread establishment of collective bargaining,
the protection of job tenure from unfair union interference finds new appli-
cations. It required only a minor ex-tension of this doctrine for the courts
to recognize the right to continued union membership against arbitrary ex-
pulsion.22 This well-established right of workmaen to job security against
malicious interference by union officials should logically include all collective
negotiations affecting continued job terms and tenure. The customary de-
pendence of this rationale upon an existing employment relation2 might
prevent inclusion of the reinstatement opportunities of those already dis-
charged; but the traditional vagueness of legal "malice" has hindered the
development of definite limitations on its protection to present employees.
18. Bogni v. Perotti, 224 fass. 152, 112 N. E. R53 (1916), is actually a square
holding. A small local sought an injunction against jurisdictional strikes by the Hod-
carriers Union, which was seeking to absorb the local; but a Massachusetts statute
(fass. Laws 1914, c. 778) forbade an injunction unless some property right was endan-
gered, and specifically stated that the right to go to work was not a property right. The
court held that access to work vas such a property right that a statutory provision
attempting to take it away was unconstitutional. The plaintiff local whose "property"
was thus threatened and protected was a branch of the I. W. V. See also note 12 supra.
The influence of this doctrine has declined: see Mr. Justice Butler, dissenting in Senn
v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 463, 483 (1937).
19. See Grand Int. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Aaiz. 379,
399-401, 31 P. (2d) 971, 979 (1934).
20. But see note 29 infra.
21. "By the weight of authority, the unjustified interference of third persons is
actionable although the employment is at will," Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 33 (1915).
In that case the right was protected against invasion by the state, but cases involving
interference by third parties have been cited interchangeably. Lucke v. Clothing Cutters
and Trimmers' Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 26 AtI. 505 (1S93) ; Berry v. Donovan, 13 Mass.
353, 74 N. E. 603 (1905); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 99-100, 44 N. E. 1077,
1078 (1896).
22. Eschman v. Huebner, 226 Ill. App. 537 (1922), an extreme case of persecution
of a member by the officials for personal reasons; Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J.
L. 729, 65 At. 165 (1906). For discussion of the stake in union membership, as a prop-
erty right, see Fleming v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, 16 N. J. Misc. 502, 509,
1 A. (2d) 850, 853 (Ch.. 1933), aff'd, 124 N. J. Eq. 269, 1 A. (2d) 3M6 (1938).
23. Although non-union men discharged under a closed-shop agreement have often
received redress, workers unable to secure employment in the same situation usually have
no legal rights. They cannot attack the agreement, Hoban v. Dempsey, 217 Mass. 165,
104 N. E. 717 (1914); nor can they secure admission to the unkin, Mayer v. Journrvymen
Stonecutters' Association, 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 Atl. 492 t1SlAO.
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An important advantage in the "malice" concept is that it limits judicial
intervention to those cases in which the official has been motivated by per-
sonal reasons. Thus, no redress will be granted where there is reason to
believe that the interests of the unio will be served by the discharge of a
member. Furthermore, the evidentiary difficulties of proving malice will
sanction intervention by the courts only where the unjustifiable interference
with employment is unmistakable.
A few reported decisions point toward this approach. First, collective
bargaining terms established in good faith have been held privileged to injure
some workmen in carrying out union policy. A variety of agreements have
been justified on this principle: rearrangements abridging existing railroad
seniority rights ;24 closed shop contracts, now increasingly classified as bona-
fide rather than malicious;25 most strikingly, provisions for the abolition
of underpaid jobs to protect standard trade union rates .2  An occasional
remark in these cases suggests that bad faith might change the result."7
Secondly, a few seniority decisions have granted relief to workmen deprived
of job status by the union's agreement. The definite and long-term character
of seniority ratings originally encouraged the courts to review the union's
interpretation of its rules, on the traditional contract theory.28 By a signifi-
cant change in later cases the seniority right has been made incidental to
a broader judicial supervision over the fairness of collective bargaining
proceedings. Thus, seniority determinations by an arbitration board have
been annulled for lack of notice to the workman concerned. The interference-
with-employment rationale was invoked here,20 and it reappears in two cases
24. Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705 (1934) ; Hartley v. Brother-
hood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N. W. 885 (1938).
25. See, for examples, F. F. East Co. v. United Oystermen's Union, 21 A. (2d) 799
(N. J. Eq. 1941); Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547 (1938), appeal dis-
missed, 303 U. S. 621 (1933). See 1 TELLER, LABOR DiSPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING (1940) §§ 97-99, 170; (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 754.
26. O'Keefe v. Local 463 of United Ass'n of Plumbers, 277 N. Y. 300, 14 N. E.
(2d) 77, 117 A. L. R. 817, 823 (1938). In this case a company had repeatedly paid its
employees below union rates; finally the union withdrew those men from their jobs and
furnished the company with new plumbers who would not accept the lower wages. The
displaced workmen were held to have no redress, as the union's action was a reasonable
measure to protect its own welfare. See also Rhea Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 231 Wis. 643, 650, 285 N. W. 749, 752 (1939).
27. See Hartley v. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship Clerks, 283 Mich. '201, 207,
277 N. W. 885, 887 (1938); O'Keefe v. Local 463 of United Ass'n of Plumbers, 277
N. Y. 300, 309, 14 N. E. (2d) 77, 80 (1938); Grand Int. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Marshall, 119 S. W. (2d) 908, 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
28. Robinson v. Dahm, 94 Misc. 729, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1053 (Sup, Ct. 1916); see
also Gregg v. Starks, 188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920). The broad language of one
important early case seems to say that a seniority rating is a vested individual right
which the union cannot take away; see Piercy v. Louisville and Nashville Ry., 198 Ky.
477, 484-85, 248 S. W. 1042, 1045-46 (1923). And see Gleason v. Thomas, 117 W. Va.
550, 186 S. E. 304 (1936).
29. "The right to earn a livelihood and to continue in employment unmolested by
efforts to enforce void enactments should . . . be entitled to protection," Griffin v. Chi-
cago Union Station Co., 13 F. Supp. 722, 724 (N. D. Ill. 1936), aff'd sub nom. Nord
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overruling regular collective negotiations. In Bucko v. Murray0 a New
York court has recently granted a temporary injunction against an allegedly
unfair referendum provided by the collective agreement. Taking a broad
ground, the court distinguished privileged bona-fide agreements; "but labor
organizations are not permitted to act in bad faith or through malice or
ill will nor may they be actuated by malice or a desire to injure employees,
whether the latter be members of the union or not."3' A further step is
the remedy in damages against the union or the officials. In Order of Rail-
way Conductors v. Jones,32 a railroad agreed to the union's seniority recom-
mendations, and discharged a conductor. The trial showed that the union
was really seeking unfairly to eliminate the man, and the court upheld his
right to damages from the union for such interference with the employer's
will.33 Since frequent intervention in several types of intra-union disputes
has left legitimate union activities largely unscathed, organized labor's dis-
trust of any supervision by the courts now seems unrealistic.
The effective application of this weapon could perhaps be useful in helping
to dislodge the corrupt officials entrenched in a few unions. If an active
minority is already restless, public disclosure and punishment of official
tyranny may provide an opportunity to revive popular control. On the
other hand, outsiders do not generally appreciate the frequent loyalty of
union members even to the most venal leaders,3 4 and indiscriminate external
intervention may consolidate support of a dishonest union administration.
Changes of regime imposed from outside will not usually correct the causes
of abuses in American trade unions.
In different situations where the question of the relation of a workman
to union officials has been raised, the various loose analogies to business
and personal relations have proved useful. It must be remembered that a
trade union's internal affairs present a unique problem. Yet, by careful
development of available concepts where these correspond to industrial reali-
ties, it should be possible for courts to extend legal protection to victimized
individuals without interfering with necessary trade union activities.
v. Griffin, 86 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936); see also Estes v. Union Terminal Co.,
89 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937).
30. 170 Misc. 902, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 402 (Sup. Ct. 1939), ihjimiction dissolvcd, jitdg-
ment for dcfendants (1939), see 283 N. Y. 634, 28 N. E. (2d) 35, 36 (1940), judgicn!
aff'd nem., 258 App. Div. 867, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 537 (1st Dep't 1939), aff'd mere., 283
N. Y. 634, 28 N. E. (2d) 35 (1940).
31. Id. at 904, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) at 404.
32. 78 Colo. 80, 239 Pac. 882 (1925).
33. The possibility of a right to damages against the union officials was suggested
in Young v. Canadian Northern Ry., [1930] 3 D. L. R. 352, 364, (Man. C. A.) (con-
curring opinion), cited supra note 15: "It may be that his rights are so plain and the
bias of the committee so evident that he has a cause of action against them, if a legal
duty to aid him could be held to exist."
34. Of course in these situations the officials have been prudent enough to ensure
popular support by securing substantial gains for their members. See, for e.uample, Sum-
MAN, Lanon CzARs (1938) 17-20.
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THE TAXATION OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AS ASSOCIATIONS*
IT is a well established rule1 of federal income taxation that a "strict"
trust whose function is to conserve its res until liquidation is taxable in the
same category as an individual,2 whereas a "business" trust, "a medium for
the conduct of a business and sharing its gains," is taxable as an "associa-
tion." Like several other business organizations corporate in substance but
non-corporate in form,4 the business trust is a device commonly employed
to minimize corporate taxes.5
The need for differentiating between strict and business trusts is made
apparent by two recent decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. According to the terms of the trust agreements before the
court in Commissioner v. Chase National Bank" the grantor, an investment
corporation, made up "units" consisting of sixteen shares of the common
stock of thirty specified corporations, and deposited this portfolio of care-
fully selected securities with a bank as trustee, the bank delivering to the
grantor certificates of interest in the securities. The trust shares were then
sold to the general public by the depositor-grantor. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue classified the trusts as associations and taxable as such
under Section 801(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934.1 The Circuit Court,
however, affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 8 that these
were strict trusts not taxable as associations. On almost identical facts0 in
* Commissioner v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of N. Y., 122 F. (2d) 540 (C. C. A.
2d, 1941); Commissioner v. North American Bond Trust, 122 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A.
2d, 1941).
1. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344 (1935); Hamilton Depositors Corp.
v. Nicholas, 111 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940); Sears v. Hassett, 111 F. (2d) 961
(C. C. A. 1st, 1940) ; United States v. Trust No. B. I. 35, 107 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 9th,
1939) ; Ittleson v. Anderson, 67 F. (2d) 323 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ; Continental Batik &
Trust of N. Y. v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 15 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
2. 53 STAT. 66 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 161 (1934).
3. 53 STAT. 469 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 3797 (Supp. 1939).
4. See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344, 360 (1935); Equitable Trust
Co. v. Magruder, 37 F. Supp. 711, 714 (D. Md. 1941); Investment Trust of Mutual
Investment Co., 27 B. T. A. 1322, 1330 (1933), aff'd, 71 F. (2d) 1009 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934); Dean, Federal Taxation of Trusts as Associations (1940) 14 Tztp. L. Q. 333;
Warren, The Reduction of Income Taxes Through The Use of Trusts (1936) 34 Micit.
L. REv. 809.
5. For a complete discussion of tax avoidance by the use of the business trust, see
Jones, Trusts: Instrumentalities For Avoiding Taxes (1938) 27 GEo. L. J. 18; Silbert,
Voluntary Trusts and Federal Taxation (1937) 17 B. U. L. REv. 1; Warren, loc. cit.
supra note 4.
6. 122 F. (2d) 540 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
7. 48 STAT. 771 (1934), 26 U. S. C. § 1696 (1934).
8. Chase Nat. Bank of the City of N. Y., Trustee, 41 B. T. A. 430 (1940). This
decision is discussed in Dean, supra note 4, at 341-42.
9. In the North American case the investment corporation, as grantor of the trust,
selected eligible bonds (the corpus in the Chase case consisted of stocks) which were
deposited with the trustee. Certificates of interest were issued by the trustee to the de-
positor, which were then sold to the public.
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the companion case decided on the same day, Commissioner v. North Amcri-
can Bond Trust,'0 the same court reversed the Board of Tax Appeals"
and held the trust taxable as an association. The court distinguished these
cases on the ground that the depositor in the Chase case, in creating addi-
tional interests in the trust corpus for sale to investors, was obliged to
deposit new stock "units" made up of exactly the same number of shares
in the same corporations as those deposited in the original units. On the
other hand, the terms of the agreement in the North Amcrican case provided
that the depositor in making up new units was not confined to bonds of
the same corporations as those that had been selected for the original bond
units.'-' These new bonds were commingled with the original deposits, so
that all certificate holders, both old and new, shared equally in the new pool
of original bonds, plus whatever new bonds the depositor had selected. From
this distinction the court concluded that the depositor in the latter case was
empowered to "vary the existing investments of all certificate holders at
will . . . and in this way to take advantage of the market variations to
improve the investments even of the first investors." 13
There have been three clearly marked stages in the development of the
principles which determine whether a particular trust is to be taxed as an
association.' 4 The first stage appeared in Crocker v. AMallcy, which held
the decisive test to be the degree of control exercised by the beneficiaries over
the management of the trust. The second stage was marked by Hecht v.
Malley,"; in which the Supreme Court rejected the control test and held a trust
to be an association when its trustees were "associated together in much the
same manner as the directors in a corporation for the purpose of carrying on
business enterprises."' 7 The latest stage of this evolution was reached in
Morrisscy, v. Commissioner,18 which held an association to be a "common
effort . . . for the conduct of a business enterprise"'' in a quasi-corporate
form.20 Precedent for the decisions in the instant cases stemmed from this
10. 122 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
11. Record, p. 166, Commissioner v. North American Bond Trust, 122 F. (2d) 545
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
12. Commissioner v. North American Bond Trust, 122 F. (2d) 545, 546 (C. C. A.
2d, 1941).
13. Ibid.
14. For a more complete study of the evolution of these principles, see Dean, supra
note 4, at 335-37; (1937) 26 ILL. B. J. 127.
15. 249 U. S. 223 (1919).
16. 265 U. S. 144 (1924).
17. Id. at 161.
18. 296 U. S. 344 (1935).
19. Id. at 357. The requirement that an association must consist of persons asso-
dated in a common effort receives a detailed analysis in Equitable Trust Co. v. Ma-
gruder, 37 F. Supp. 711, 715 (D. Md. 1941), where it is stated: "The substance of the
distinction between a nontaxable trust, and a . . . business trust . . . lies in the intrin-
sic nature of the enterprise and the relation of the several associates thereto, rather titan
in . . . technical distinctions." See also Dean, supra note 4, at 347-48.
20. This case also propounded five subordinate criteria to be used in determining
whether the trust had a corporate structure. These were: (1) title to the property held
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decision, which established the rule that a trust is taxable as an association
when two essential factors are present. First, the entity must be a common
enterprise for the transaction of business for profit.2' Secondly, the struc-
tural characteristics of the specific trust must be analogous to those of a
corporation.2 2 In both principal cases the formal provisions of the trust agree-
ments include all the salient corporate elements: continuity of interests, 8
centralized management, 24 limited liability,25 and transferable shares. 20
The Treasury regulations 27 promulgated pursuant to the Morrissey de-
cision 28 attempt to distinguish between "association" and "trust" on the
basis of these two factors. An association is an organization "whether . . .
created by an agreement, a declaration of trust, a statute, or otherwise,"2 0
which, like a corporation, continues notwithstanding a change in member-
by the trust; (2) centralized management by the trustees; (3) continuity of trustees
as a self-perpetuating body; (4) transferable beneficial interests; (5) limited liability.
Recent cases demonstrate a general adoption of these criteria as controlling oin the ques-
tion of quasi-corporateness. Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U. S. 385 (1937); Com-
missioner v. Rector & Davidson, 111 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) ; Hamilton De-
positors Corp. v. Nicholas, 111 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940) ; Wellston Hills Syndi-
cate Fund v. Commissioner, 101 F. (2d) 924 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939). See (1936) 20 MIN?;.
L. REv. 445; cf. Commissioner v. Vandegrift Realty and Investment Co., 82 F. (2d) 387
(C. C. A. 9th, 1936); Commissioner v. Gibbs-Preyer Trusts Nos. I & 2, 117 F. (2d) 619,
623 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
21. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344, 357 (1935).
22. Id. at 359.
23. In both principal cases the trust agreements provided that the death or incapac-
ity of a certificate holder would not terminate the trust, that the trust was not to be
liquidated for twenty years, and that there would always be a trustee to administer the
agreements. See Hamilton Depositors Corp v. Nicholas, 111 F. (2d) 385, 387 (C. C. A.
10th, 1940), where the court said "the fact that management is shared between the trus-
tee and the corporation [depositor] does not destroy continuity or centralization of man-
agement."
24. The depositor directs the management of these trusts and occupies tile position
of a board of directors, the activities of which are restricted by the trust agreement,
which is analogous to a corporate charter. The trustees, like corporate officers, act as
administrators of the will of the depositor.
25. Commissioner v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of N. Y., 122 F. (2d) 540, 542 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1941); Record, p. 65, Commissioner v. North American Bond Trust, 122 F.
(2d) 545 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); cf. Best v. Helvering, 92 F. (2d) 491 (App. D. C.,
1937), holding a trust taxable as an association despite the fact that there was no lim-
ited liability.
26. Id. at 542, 544; Commissioner v. North American Bond Trust, 122 F. (2d) 545,
547 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
27. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 801-1 to 801-3.
28. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344, 354-55 (1935). The court said:
"Where Revenue Act merely provided that the term 'corporation' should include 'asso-
ciations,' . . . the Treasury Department was authorized to supply rules for the enforce-
ment of the Act within the permissible bounds of administrative construction," and the
Department could clarify or enlarge the regulations "so as to meet administrative exig-
encies or conform to judicial decision." See also Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S.
299, 303-07 (1932).
29. U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 801-2,
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ship, and whose affairs are conducted by a group acting in a representative
capacity. "It includes . . . an 'investment' trust (whether of the fixed
or the management type) . . ."0 The term, trust, according to the terms
of these regulations, refers to an "ordinary" 31 trust, in which the trustees
merely protect and conserve the corpus until such time as it can most
advantageously be liquidated, as distinguished from an arrangement designed
to afford a medium for a profit-seeking activity accruing to the benefit of
the shareholders. Such an entity is said to be a substitute for a voluntary
association to obtain corporate advantages without their attending disad-
vantages.
This "ordinary" or "traditional" type of trust, referred to in both the
Mllorrissey case and the Treasury regulations, is generally understood to
be one in which the grantor conveys property to the trustee to be conserved
for the benefit of named persons. 32 The agreements in both of the principal
cases provide for the creation of the "corpus" only upon the purchase of
beneficial interests from the "grantor." In addition, there is a continual aug-
mentation of the trust res by further deposits of securities purchased with
funds furnished by "beneficiaries" drawn from the general public. Further-
more, the admitted purpose in creating these trusts was not the ordinary
one, but rather, in the words of the court itself, "to provide investors with
a means for acquiring an undivided beneficial interest in . . . securities
and to enable them to participate in a relatively wide-spread investment."-3
An enterprise with 67,000 beneficiaries and which had received $662,000 in
dividends during the taxable year is palpably different from the "ordinary"
trust referred to in the Morrissey case and the Treasury regulations.
It is true that the chief function of these "trust administrators" was the
conservation of the underlying securities, but this protective function alone
does not make a strict trust of a business enterprise. It is characteristic of
all investment companies that its managers, like the depositor in the instant
cases, first select securities for the small investor and then devote constant
attention to the preservation of the quality of these investments. In the
investment company, as in these trusts, goods and services are sold by the
managing experts to the general public.34 The fact that these certificate
holders are in reality stockholders of an investment company is further
demonstrated by their power to take advantage of a favorable fluctuation
30. Ibid.
31. Id., Art. 801-3.
32. Cf. United States v. Davidson, 115 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); Commis-
sioner v. Kelley, 74 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934) ; Commissioner v. Morriss Realty
Co. Trust No. 2, 68 F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 7l, 1934) ; Blair Y. Wilson Syndicate Trust,
39 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
33. Commissi6ner v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of N. Y., 12- F. (2d) 540, 541 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1941).
34. Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F. (2d) 865, 86S (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
The court said: "The large investment .. .in . . . securities required active manage-
ment. To keep such a fund invested in securities to the best advantage vas to engage in
business in the fullest sense." See Stanley Securities Co. v. United States, 38 F. (2d)
907 (Ct. Cl. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 845 (1930).
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in the market price of the constituent stocks.85  The certificate holder is
entitled to surrender his trust shares to the trustee in exchange for his
proportionate share of the underlying securities, which then can be sold on
the market, or he can sell his freely transferable trust certificate directly
on the open market.36 The depositor in the Chase case could at any time
eliminate constituent securities no longer qualified to preserve the sound
investment character of the stock units. In 1933 alone the trustee, at the
direction of the depositor, disposed of stocks in the portfolio valued at
$600,000 in the course of these so-called "weeding-out activities." 87 Thus,
even though there was no purchase of new securities to improve the invest-
ment as in the North Anterican case, there was a sale of unproductive securi-
ties which obviously improved the existing investment of the certificate
holders. Moreover, the depositor in making up new portfolios was author-
ized to limit his selection of stocks to those original corporations which had
yielded a return lucrative enough to have been retained as constituent cor-
porations. These activities were in response to market fluctuations, as were
the purchases of new bonds in the North American case, and they were
designed to improve the character of the Chase investment.
Furthermore, it may well be that in view of the Morrissey decision an invest-
ment trust is to be classified as an association even if its only activities are
the collection of income and its distribution to the beneficiaries. 88 The
Supreme Court in that case held the trust to be taxable as an association
even after it had disposed of the trust property in exchange for shares in
35. See dissent of Judge Augustus Hand in Commissioner v. Chase Nat. Bank of
City of N. Y., 122 F. (2d) 540, 544 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Investment Trust of Mutual
Investment Co., 27 B. T. A. 1322, 1329 (1933), aft'd, 71 F. (2d) 1009 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934).
36. During the taxable year some 3,000,000 outstanding certificates of interest were
surrendered to the trustee of the Chase trusts in exchange for shares of the underlying
securities, while only 138 certificates were surrendered to the trustee of the North Amerl-
can Bond Trust.
37. 122 F. (2d) 540, 543 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). On the other hand, in the North
American case, where the court based its decision largely upon the fact that the depositor
was empowered to vary the investment, none of the constituent bonds were eliminated,
nor were any new bonds purchased, during the taxable year.
38. See dissent in Commissioner v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of N. Y., 122 F. (2d)
540, 544 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; see also Kettleman Hills Royalty Syndicate No. 1 v. Com-
missioner, 116 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940), holding a trust taxable as an associa-
tion if the administrator of trust makes "business judgments;" Fidelity-Bankers Trust
Co. v. Helvering, 113 F. (2d) 14 (App. D. C. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 649 (1940);
Investment Trust of Mutual Investment Co., 27 B. T. A. 1322, 1329 (1933); (1936) 84
U. or PA. L. REv. 666, n. 14. But cf. Higgins v. Commissioner, 61 Sup. Ct. 475 (U. S.
1941), holding that personal management of taxpayer's own investments in securities does
not constitute "carrying on a business" within a statute permitting deduction of expenses
incurred in computing taxable net income; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.
(2d) 481 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940), cert. denied, 61 Sup. Ct. 809 (U. S. 1941) ; but see Dean,
supra note 4, at 341-43. See also (1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 835, 837, posing question of
"whether it was actually the intent of Congress to tax such a device, the sole purpose of




a corporation. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes stressed the fact that confining
trust activities to the collection and distribution of income "did not alter
the character of the organization. It was not a liquidating trust; it
was still an organization for profit."' 3
The criteria propounded by the Supreme Court in the Morrissey case 4o
and elaborated by the Treasury regulations have the merits of directness and
simplicity, but their efficacy has been limited by lower court construction.
The basis of the Morrissey decision would seem to have been undermined
by judicial emphasis upon the minutiae of the trust agreements, rather than
upon the overall effect of the trust's activities. Emphasis upon the latter
aspects of each case would prevent trusts, such as the one in the Chase case,
from relying upon purely formal distinctions to avoid sharing the corporate
tax burden with trusts which are inherently alike.
STATE INJUNCTIONS AGAINST EMPLOYEES SUING IN FEDERAL
COURTS UNDER EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT*
By abrogating the common law defense of the fellow servant rule,1 intro-
ducing the doctrine of comparative negligence,2 and abolishing the common
law defense of assumption of risk,3 the Employers' Liability Act enlarged
the rights of injured employees of railroads operating in interstate com-
merce.4 Early decisions under the Act required employee-litigants to sue
in the state of the railroad's incorporation,5 often an extremely costly require-
ment since the railroad might have its home in a state far distant from that
in which the accident occurred. The Amendment of 1910 was consequently
added to the Act;6 it included a venue provision that an action might be
brought:
39. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344, 361 (1935).
40. The principles propounded in the Morrissey decision were applied in t,.o recent
cases in which investment trusts were held to be taxable as associations. Hamilton De-
positors Corp. v. Nicholas, 111 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940); Continental Ban]: &
Trust Co. of N. Y. v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 15 (S. D. N. Y. 1937). These trusts
were identical with the trusts in the principal cases in all material respects, except that
funds realized upon elimination of constituent securities could be reinvested. However,
reinvestment of itself should not be the controlling factor, for in the Morils American
case the trustee could not reinvest any funds; yet the trust was held taxable as an asso-
ciation.
* Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 62 Sup. Ct. 6 (U. S. 1941).
1. 53 STAT. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 54 (Supp. 1939).
2. 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 53 (1934).
3. 53 STAT. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 54 (Supp. 1939).
4. 53 STAT. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 51 (Supp. 1939).
5. Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 173 Fed. 527 (W. D. Te. 1909) ; see Trapp
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 283 Fed. 655, 656 (N. D. Ohio 1922).
6. 53 STAT. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 56 (Supp. 1939).
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"in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the
cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing
business at the time of commencing such action."
To protect state jurisdiction once obtained under this mandate, Congress
inserted a proviso that actions originating in state courts could not be
removed to the federal courts.
The employee who chooses to sue in the courts of a state other than that
in which the accident occurred is often met by equitable forunt non coniveniens
proceedings brought by his employer to confine him to courts within the
state, and perhaps even within the district, where the accident occurred.
Such a situation arose in the recent case of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v.
Kepner7 where an employee injured in an accident in Ohio brought suit
under the Employers' Liability Act in the United 'States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York. The Railroad asked the Common Pleas
Court of Hamilton County, Ohio, where it operated a part of its system,
to enjoin the employee from prosecuting his suit in the federal court, alleging
that by suing at a place more than seven hundred miles from his residence
and from the place of the accident, the employee would cause it great in-
convenience and unwarranted expense. The Railroad relied on the equity
power of courts to restrain persons within their jurisdiction from prose-
cuting suits which would be unduly harassing or oppressive to defendants,
The Court of Common Pleas, denying the injunction, held that the equity
power of forum non conveniens did not extend to suits brought in federal
courts under the Employers' Liability Act. Its decision was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Ohio 8 and subsequently by the Supreme Court of
the United States.0
Resolution of the problem confronting the Court in the Kepner case
demands, first of all, a summary of existing inter-court relationships, Since
1793 federal courts have been virtually prohibited by statute from enjoining
proceedings in state courts.10 A parallel limitation prevails in the converse
situation where a state cotirt attempts to enjoin a federal court proceeding.
In the first case to come before it, the Supreme Court of the United States
formulated the rule that state courts are without power to issue such in-
junctions." Despite the rule, however, many courts have effectually blocked
proceedings in the courts of other sovereignties by the simple expedient of
enjoining the litigants rather than the courts themselves. In support of this
action, they have fallen back on the familiar propositions that equity acts
7. 62 Sup. Ct. 6 (U. S. 1941).
8. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 137 Ohio St. 409, 30 N. E. (2d) 982 (1940)
(Chief Justice Weygandt dissenting).
9. 62 Sup. Ct. 6 (U. S. 1941) (Stone, C. J., Roberts and Frankfurter, JJ., dis-
senting).
10. 1 STAT. 334 (1793), 28 U. S. C. § 379 (1934), as amended by 36 STAT. 1162
(1911), 28 U. S. C. §279 (1934) (allowing injunctions in bankruptcy cases). Accord,
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 10 U. S. L. WEEK 4025 (U. S. 1941); Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922).
11. M'Kim v. Voories, 7 Cranch. 279 (U. S. 1812). See Pozrmaoy, EguiTy Junis-
PRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) § 2062.
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in personam and that, while courts may not stay proceedings in courts of
another sovereignty, they have jurisdiction over persons within their terri-
torial limits.'
2
Federal courts, with a single exception, 13 have refrained from enjoining
litigants from suing under the Employers' Liability Act in other federal
courts. 14 They reason that the right to sue in federal courts is given by
Congress under its power to regulate interstate commerce. In proceeding
under this general power, Congress may incidentally burden such commerce
as, for example, by authorizing suits in any district court where the defendant
does business.
There are no federal decisions recognizing a state court's injunction,
issued because of inconvenience, unnecessary expense, or hardship, against
an employee proceeding in a federal court under the Employers' Liability
Act.15 In the case of Southcrn Railway v. Painter,1 the District Court
interpreted the state court's decree against the employee restraining him from
continuing his suit in the federal court of his choice as being in effect an
injunction against the federal court proceeding itself and therefore invalid.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
state court had exceeded its authority and affirmed the decision. 17 The court
discussed the nature of the dual court system and indicated that federal
courts must be free to decide cases within their jurisdiction without inter-
ference from state courts. Having invalidated the injunction, the court said
that it was not worthy of full faith and credit, and went on to enjoin the
Railroad from further exercise of its alleged rights under the injunction.
But in reversing this decision, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that federal courts are not able to issue counter injunctions to stay litigation
in state courts even though intended to support prior jurisdiction in the fed-
eral court.'8 Presented simultaneously as they were, the Kepner and Painter
cases throw the problem of injunctions against litigants suing under the Em-
ployers' Liability Act into sharp relief.
12. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890); Steelman v. All Continent Co., 301
U. S. 278 (1937); Kern v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446
(1933).
13. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Bole, 31 F. Supp. 221 (N. D. W. Va. 1940). But cf.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Clem, 36 F. Supp. 703 (N. D. W. Va. 1941). This single
exception is specifically overruled in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 62 Sup. Ct. 6
(U. S. 1941).
14. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Vigor, 90 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 6th1,J937); cf. South-
ern Ry. v. Cochran, 56 F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); accord, Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
15. Cf. Bryant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 92 F. (2d) 5b9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937);
Rader v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 108 F. (2d) 930 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), ccri. dcmicd,
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Rader, 309 U. S. 682 (1940).
16. 10 U. S. L. WEEK 4032 (U. S. 1941) (opinion of District Court for Eastern
District of Missouri not reported).
17. Southern Ry. v. Painter, 117 F. (2d) 100 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
18. 10 U. S. L. WEnK 4032 (U. S. 1941). The employee litigant is thus forced to
appeal a state court's erroneous decree that he may not proceed in the federal court. Cf.
Bryant v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 92 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
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The Court's decision in the Kepner case, allowing employees the free
choice of federal forums conferred on them by the terms of the Employers'
Liability Act, merits approval. It eliminates the confusion of injunctions
and cross injunctions inevitably arising in the Painter situation. It accords,
moreover, with the position maintained by the federal courts that the matter
of a litigant's convenience is legislative and beyond the judicial province.10
Federal jurisdiction under the Employers' Liability Act is mandatory, 0
and if proceedings may be enjoined on grounds of inconvenience, federal
courts are placed in the awkward position of being forced to take a juris-
diction which they cannot assume without ignoring another court's decree.
The decision removes the likelihood that such a dilemma will occur.
Nor can convincing argument for issuing injunctions against litigants pro-
ceeding in distant federal courts under the Employers' Liability Act be
found in state decisions. Decisions that state courts may enjoin litigants
from prosecuting suits under the Act in courts of other states rest on the
premise that the jurisdictional limitations of the 1910 Amendment do not
affect the state's equitable functions.21 But to conclude thus runs counter
to both the meaning and the purpose of the Amendment. State legislatures
cannot confine causes of action arising under the Employers' Liability Act
to their own courts.22 These courts should not be able to require what
sovereign states cannot.
In relation to the Kepner situation, the state cases are further weakened
by the fact that injunctions against litigants proceeding in federal courts
are often refused by state courts which liberally grant decrees to prevent
litigants from continuing actions in other state courts.23 The difference in
treatment is rationalized by the argument that a state court's jurisdiction
is only permissive, whereas a federal court's jurisdiction is mandatory2 ' But
19. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912); Scliendel v. McGee,
300 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; Connelly v. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 238 Fed.
932 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
20. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912); Wood v. Delaware &
H. R. R., 63 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ; Norris v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 18 F. (2d)
584 (D. Minn. 1925).
21. Kern v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446 (1933);
Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Cent. R. 1, 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794 (1918); cf. Ex parte
Crandall, 52 F. (2d) 650 (S. D. Ind. 1931). The Supreme Court's first decision on this
matter will soon be forthcoming in Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. R. (Tenn. Sup, Ct. Jan.
10, 1941), cert. granted, 10 U. S. L. WF. K 3157 (U. S. 1941).
22. Payne v. Knapp, 197 Iowa 737, 198 N. W. 62 (1924) ; Peterson v. Chicago, B.
& Q. Ry., 187 Minn. 228, 244 N. W. 823 (1932); cf. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sowers,
213 U. S. 55 (1909).
23. Kern v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446 (1933) (state
court enjoined employee from proceeding in Missouri court); McConnell v. Thomson,
213 Ind. 16, 8 N. E. (2d) 986, 113 A. L. R. 1429, 1444 (1937) (state court refused to
enjoin employee from proceeding in federal court in Missouri).
24. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 137 Ohio St. 409, 30 N. E. (2d) 982 (1940) ;
McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. 16, 8 N. E. (2d) 986, 113 A. L. R. 1429, 1444 (1937) ;
cf. Rader v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 108 F (2d) 980 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cert. deuied,
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Rader, 309 U. S. 682 (1940).
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the argument is not convincing because, under the Employers' Liability Act,
a state court is duty bound to take jurisdiction except where the local
statutory or0 common law doctrine of forum non convenewns is contrary.'
Assertions by state courts that they may enjoin suits under the Employers'
Liability Act in another state court on some basis of forum non conz'cicns
convey an erroneous impression. The decisions do not bear out the expressed
sentiment. There is a noticeable reluctance toward granting such injunctions,
manifested by the setting of severe, if not impossible, requirements. This
aversion is translated into terms such as undue hardship, clear invasi,in of
rights, oppression, and fraud; inconvenience alone does not suffice.2
0 In
addition to their unwillingness to enjoin, state courts have further demon-
strated their disfavor toward the application of fortam non convcnin s to
Employers' Liability Act cases by disregarding foreign injunctions issued
against them.2 7 Moreover, one court issuing an injunction against proceed-
ings in a distant state court has itself made the injunction proceedings
meaningless by awarding only nominal damages to the railroad where the
employee violated the injunction.2
If the language of the 1910 Amendment to the Employers' Liability Act
is not plain and dear, but is sufficiently ambiguous to warrant construction
of its meaning, other materials are available. The legislative history of the
Act reveals that Congress was seeking to extend, from time to time, the
25. Both the duty and the common law exception are stated in Sccond Employers'
Liability Act Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 57 (1912), where it was said that a state court must
entertain jurisdiction of Employers' Liability Act cases .when its ordinary jurisdiction
as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion . . . and (it is) accustimed
to exercise that jurisdiction." By negative implication this language permits courts to
refuse jurisdiction under the Act where local law .allows them discretionary power in
this situation. Cf. Hoffman v. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21 (1927); Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill.
563, 115 N. E. 2 (1917) ; see 2 ROBERTs, FFD.L LIABILITIES OF CArtwIErns (2d ed. 192 J)
1843.
In Douglas v. New Haven R. R., 279 U. S. 377 (1929), a procedural statute of Ncw
York was interpreted to allow her courts discretion to refuse jurisdiction of suits by non-
residents against foreign corporations. This statute is, however, unique.
But the exception to the Employer's Liability Act which the Supreme Court allows
to state courts because of local law is far different from either requiring these same
courts to submit to injunctions from other forums or allowing them to enjoin litigants
suing elsewhere.
26. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Inlow, 64 Ohio App. 134, 28 N. E. (2d) 373 (1910);
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Wolf, 199 Wis. 278, 226 N. W. 297 (1929) ; Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N. W. 218 (1921); Missouri-Kansas-Te:xas
R. R. v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (192S); Mobile & Ohio R. IL v. Parrent, 260
Ill. App. 284 (1931); Southern Pacific Co. v. Baum, 39 N. M. 22, 38 P. (2d) 1106
(1934); cf. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Clem, 36 F. Supp. 703 (N. D. ,V. Va. 1941);
see Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 18, 95 So. 385, 318 (1922).
27. Kepner v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry., 322 Mo. 299, 15 S. W. (2d) 825 (1929);
Peterson v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 187 Minn. 228, 244 N. W. 823 (1932); Taylor V.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 292 Ill. App. 457, 11 N. E. (2d) 610 (1937); cf. Lindsey v.
Wabash Ry., 61 S. IV. (2d) 369 (Mo. App. 1933).
28. New York, C. & St. L. P. R. v. Meek, 210 Ind. 322, 1 N. E. (2d) 611 (193t).
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rights and privileges of employees. 29 By the Amendment of 1910, Congress
intended that the employee-litigant under the Act should be unrestricted in
his choice of forum within the limitations of its venue provisiolis.a°
But railroad litigants resorting to the forum non conveniens doctrine to
circumvent the Act have attempted to restrict this choice. The abundance of
this litigation may indicate that employees have been so completely liberated
that they may harass railroads by choosing distant or friendly forums. But
even assuming this to be true, the solution is not to be found in injunction
litigation which is not productive of substantial justice, depending as it does
on strategic disposition of property and financial invulnerability. Therefore,
despite the unquestionable strength of the equitable forum non conveniens
doctrine, the Supreme Court has correctly decided in Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad v. Kepner that state courts may not enjoin litigants suing in federal
courts under the Employers' Liability Act.
BUYER'S RECOVERY OF INVALIDATED PROCESSING TAX
UNDER ORIGINAL AAA*
WHEN parties to a contract for the sale of goods expect a possible change
in the taxes on such goods, it is often stipulated in the contract which
party shall bear the risk of any change. Widespread use of such stipula-
tions occurred with reference to the processing taxes imposed by the original
AAA.' That statute empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to impose
29. The first Employers' Liability Act [34 STAT. 232 (1906)] was declared unconsti-
tutional in Howard v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 207 U. S. 463 (1908). The second Employers'
Liability Act [35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. (1934)], was substantially
the same as the first, but added that the employee injured or killed by accident and
guilty of contributory negligence should not be held to be negligent, and did not assume
the risk where the common carrier had violated the Safety Appliance Act [27 STAT. 531
(1893), 45 U. S. C. § 1 ct seq. (1934)]. The constitutionality of the second act was
sustained in Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912). The statute of
limitations has been extended from one [35 STAT. 66 (1908)] to two [36 STAT. 291 (1910)]
and now to three years [52 STAT. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 56 (Supp. 1939)]. The relief
from assumption of risk has been expanded [53 STAT. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 54 (Supp.
1939)].
30. The words of the statute are clear and expansive. The legislative history further
buttresses them. See SEN. RFP. No. 432, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910) ; 45 CoNa. REc. 3996
(1910) (Messrs. Clay and Bailey); id. at 4034 (Mr. Borah: "The bill enables the plain-
tiff to find the corporation at any point or place or state where it is actually carrying on
business, and there lodge his action, if he chooses to do so.") ; id. at 4051 (Messrs. Payti-
ter and Bailey) ; id. at 4093 (Mr. Paynter) ; id. at 4158 (Messrs. Garrett and Clayton
to the effect that all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the act in question are
repealed by the doctrine of implication).
*United States v. American Packing & Provision Co., 122 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A.
10th, 1941).
1. 48 STAT. 31 (1933), 7 U. S. C. §§601-22 (1934), amended, 49 STAr. 750
(1935), declared unconstitutional in United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
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levies on the processing of various commodities and to increase or decrease
them within certain limits. 2 Processors, therefore, adopted a form of con-
tract which provided that the sale price included the processing tax as then
determined by the Secretary. It was further agreed that the sale price should
be increased or decreased in case of any change in the taxes.3 The obvious
effect of this tax clause was to guarantee to the processor a margin of profit
independent of variations in the amount of tax he might be required to pay.
Conversely, the buyer was faced with the risk of having to pay an additional
amount over the agreed price;4 a decrease in the tax, however, would
redound to his benefit.
When the processing tax was invalidated,5 many processors became en-
riched by the amount which they would otherwise have had to pay the
Government. Buyers, therefore, relying on the contract provisions as giving
them a right to such funds, sought to recover them." Procedurally, they
either brought suit directly7 or interposed this claim when sued by the
processor for the contract price.8 In general two counts were stated, one
in contract under the "up and down" provisions of the tax clause and the
other seeking quasi-contractual relief in the nature of a count for money
had and received. The only variable factors involved the actual enrichment
of the seller and the financial loss of the buyer.
2. 48 STAT. 35, 39 (1933), 7 U. S. C. §§609(b), 615 (1934), anended, 49 STAT.
763-65 (1935).
3. The following is typical of the tax provisions in contracts between processor
and buyer: "Taxes: The price named in this contract includes all taxes as at present
determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. . . . Under said Agricultural Adjustment
Act it is provided that said taxes may be changed from time to time, and it is there-
fore understood and agreed that if, after the date of this contract, said present taxes
are increased . . . then in such event the amount of such increase or increases shall
be added to the price named in this contract . . . and correspondingly, if any reduc-
tion or reductions are hereafter made in said present taxes affecting the price named
in this contract, then the seller agrees to adjust the price named herein and allow to
the buyer the amount of such reduction or reductions." See Johnson v. Igleheart Bros.,
95 F. (2d) 4, 6 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), cert. denicd, 304 U. S. 585 (1933), 33 ILL L
REv. 354.
4. For cases interpreting this phase of the contracts, see United States v. Cowden
Manufacturing Co., 312 U. S. 34 (1941); United States v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 303
U. S. 62 (1939); Telescope Folding Furniture Co. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 635
(1940); Batavia Mills, Inc. v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 447 (1937).
5. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
6. There are approximately thirty reported cases where buyers have sought to
recover the amount of the processing taxes.
7. Moundridge Milling Co. v. Cream of Wheat Corp., 105 . (2d) 366 (C. C. A.
10th, 1939); Johnson v. Igleheart Bros., 95 F. (2d) 4 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933), cert.
denied, 304 U. S. 585 (1938), 33 Iu. L. REy. 354; Johnson v. Sauer Milling Co.,
148 Kan. 861, 84 P. (2d) 934 (1938).
8. Consolidated Flour Mills v. Ph. Orth Co., 114 F. (2d) 893 (C. C. A. 7th,
1940) ; Sparks Milling Co. v. Powell, 283 Ky. 669, 143 S. W. (?d) 75 (1940) ; Mattingly
v. Smith Milling Co., 183 Miss. 505, 184 So. 635 (1938); Lucas v. Panos, 190 W'ash.
402, 68 P. (2d) 617 (1937).
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Whatever the findings of fact in any particular case, however, the pro-
cessor invariably prevailed.9 On the contractual count, it was held without
exception that the "up and down" clause was not intended to cover the
contingency that the tax might be held unconstitutional.10 In dismissing the
count for quasi-contractual relief, the courts relied primarily on two grounds.
First, it was held that the processor had not been enriched in such a way
as to entitle the buyer of processed goods to recover. Authority was found
in the rule formulated in earlier cases1 ' that a buyer could not succeed in
such cases unless the tax was stated separately from the remainder of the
price. This rule barred restitution whenever the tax was "absorbed" or
"buried" in a composite price, regardless of any actual enrichment resulting
to the seller . 2 In the second place, the buyer was denied relief where lie
failed to show that he had borne the burden of the tax, again regardless of
the seller's enrichment. 13 This rule was based on the equities of the case. 14
The buyer, it was argued, could not complain that the seller's gain was
9. The processor was held obligated to make a refund in only two cases. In
Brown v. Salter, 59 Ga. App. 579, 1 S. E. (2d) 468 (1939), the plaintiff, a grower of
peanuts, on proof that the processor had deducted the tax from the market price paid
to the grower, was Permitted to recover this amount as unpaid purchase money. In
Denison Peanut Co. v. McCraw's, Inc., 127 S. W. (2d) 499 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939),
the processor had expressly agreed to make a refund in event the tax were held invalil.
10. The only two cases in which the parties expressly contracted with referenco
to the constitutionality of the tax are Brown v. Salter, 59 Ga. App. 579, 1 S. E. (2d) 468
(1939) cited supra note 9, and Casey Jones, Inc. v. Texas Textile Mills, Inc., 87 F.
(2d) 454 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) (agreement to refund if the Supreme Court invalidated
the tax within ninety days of passage of title on the goods). In view of the widespread
doubts as to the validity of the tax, the omission of any express stipulation regarding
this eventuality was held to indicate an intention that the "up and down" clause did
not cover it. See Moundridge Milling Co. v. Cream of Wheat Corp., 105 F. (2d)
366, 370 (C. C. A. 10th, 1939).
11. Texas Co. v. Harold, 228 Ala. 350, 153 So. 442 (1933) ; Wayne County Produce
Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co., 244 N. Y. 351, 155 N. E. 669 (1927); Kastner v. Duffy-Mott
Co., 125 Misc. 886, 213 N. Y. Supp. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1925); cf. Lash's Products Co. v.
United States, 278 U. S. 175 (1929).
12. See Wayne County Produce Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co., 244 N. Y. 351, 353, 155
N. E. 669 (1927): "This is not a case where the item of the tax is absorbed in a
total or composite price to be paid at all events. In such a case the buyer is without
remedy, though the annulment of the tax may increase the profit to the seller." Accord,
Christopher v. Hoger & Co., Inc., 160 Misc. 21, 289 N. Y. Supp. 105 (Munic. Ct. 1936).
See also Note (1938) 115 A. L. R. 667.
13. Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Ph. Orth Co., 114 F. (2d) 898 (C. C. A. 7th,
1940) ; Johnson v, Igleheart Bros., 95 F. (2d) 4 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), crt. dcnicd,
304 U. S. 585 (1938); Johnson v. Sauer Milling Co., 148 Kan. 861, 84 P. (2d) 935
(1938); Johnson v. Scott County Milling Co., 21 F. Supp. 847 (E. D. Mo. 1937);
Tager v. Wool Ray Prod. Corp., 160 Misc. 19, 289 N. Y. Supp. 541 (Munic. Ct. 1936).
14. Johnson v. Igleheart Bros., 95 F. (2d) 4, 9 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), cert. dcnicd,
304 U. S. 585 (1938) ; Tager v. Wool Ray Prod. Corp., 160 Misc. 19, 289 N. Y. Supp.
541 (Munic. Ct. 1936); cf. United States v. Jefferson Electric Co., 291 U. S. 386, 402
(1934).
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unjust when he himself had been able to shift the burden along to his
vendees. Either one of these grounds individually was sufficient to defeat
the buyer's action, although in virtually all cases both were found present.
Apart from these considerations, moreover, many cases failed because the
processor had not yet recovered the tax from the Government and, thus,
according to the courts, had not become enriched.1 r In other cases,1 the
Government had taxed away 80% of the processor's enrichment under the
provisions of the so-called "windfall" tax.1
7
After the case law on the subject had become established and refined
through a considerable body of precedent, the United States, as buyer of
processed commodities, brought similar suits to recover alleged overpay-
ments to processors. Like private purchasers, the United States had bought
under contracts providing that the sale price included all federal taxes and
that the price would be adjusted to meet any change in such taxes.
18 Unlile
most private buyers, however, it was able to prove conclusively that it had
absorbed the tax passed on to it by the processor.10 Despite this difference,
the Court of Claims in two cases held that the United States stood in no
better position than any other purchaser.20 In a third case the court con-
ceded that "some equitable remedy" might be available, but held that it
had not been invoked.2 ' In the most recent case, however, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit permitted the Government to recover in
15. Hodgman Rubber Co. v. Dumaine, 93 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937);
Mattingly v. Smith 'Milling Co., 183 Miss. 505, 184 So. 635 (193); Ph. Orth Co.
v. New Richmond Roller Mills Co., 232 Wis. 491, 287 N. IV. 713 (1939).
16. Johnson . Scott County Milling Co., 21 F. Supp. 847 (E. D. Mo. 1937);
Crete Mills v. Smith Baking Co., 136 Neb. 448, 286 N. W. 333 (1939).
17. INT. REv. CoDE § 700 (1939). The constitutionality of this statute has been
upheld. White Pkg. Co. v. Robertson, 89 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) ; Louisville
Prov. Co. v. Glenn, 18 F. Supp. 423 (IV. D. Ky. 1937); Union Pkg. Co. v. Rogan,
17 F. Supp. 934 (S. D. Cal. 1937). By §§ 901-17 of the Revenue Act of 1936, refunds
to processors who paid the tax are made conditional upon a showing that the processor
did not directly or indirectly shift the tax to his vendees. These provisions are discussed
in Comment (1937) 50 IHIRv. L. REv. 477.
18. The typical tax clause in the United States contracts read as follows: "Prices
bid herein include any Federal tax heretofore imposed by the Congress which is ap-
plicable to this bid. If any sales tax, processing tax, adjustment charge, or other
taxes or charges are imposed or changed by the Congress . . . and are paid by the
contractor . . . then the prices named in this bid will be increased or decreased
accordingly . . ." See Brief for the United States, p. 7, United States v. American
Packing & Provision Co., 122 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
19. The supplies bought under these contracts were for the use of the United
States and not for resale. It is, therefore, obvious that the Government must absorb
the tax. See United States v. Hagan & Cushing Co., 115 F. (2d) 849, 852 (C. C. A.
9th, 1940) (dissenting opinion).
20. Kansas Flour Mills v. United States, 92 Ct. CL 390 (1941), cert. granted,
61 Sup. Ct. 1085 (U. S. 1941); Ismert-Hinke Milling Co. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl.
27 (1939).
21. United States v. Hagan & Cushing Co., 115 F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
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quasi-contract. 22  In arriving at this decision, the court distinguished all
cases where the buyer was a private party on the ground that the United
States had been able to prove that it would have borne the tax. The case,
however, splits with the weight of authority in holding that a separation
of tax and price is not an absolute requisite to recovery. Since the tax due
on the goods was subject to exact mathematical computation,23 the contract
provision that the price included all taxes was held to be prima facie evidence
that the buyer had put the seller in funds to pay the tax. The court, there-
fore, concluded that the vendor "had obtained money from the Government
under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience it should be
returned."
24
To reach its decision in favor of the Government the court had to hurdle
the obstacles which have developed to block recovery by buyers. In suits
based on principles of unjust enrichment, the obligation of the party enriched
does not arise from any express contract, but is imposed by law.
26 Imposi-
tion of the obligation depends on an initial finding by the court that a benefit
has been conferred.2 6 Even for an economist concentrating solely on economic
data it is difficult in the usual case to determine with accuracy which party
has been enriched and by how much.27 The mere fact, moreover, that one
party can show economically that another has been enriched at his expense
does not ipso facto decide the case. Legal barriers may defeat the action
regardless of the economic proof. If the payments are found to have been
made under a mistake of law, the rule is frequently applied that they may
not be recovered back.28  Moreover, the rule requiring statement of taxes
22. United States v. American Packing & Provision Co., 122 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A.
10th, 1941).
23. Although the tax was primarily computed on the basis of the raw commodity,
such as wheat, the AAA authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to establish conversion
factors so that the tax could be computed in terms of the processed article, such as
flour. 48 STAT. 37 (1933), 7 U. S. C. § 610(c) (1934).
24. 122 F. (2d) 445, 449 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941). The court admits that its reasoning
and conclusion are inconsistent with the reasoning and conclusion in Kansas Flour
Mills v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 390 (1941), cert. granted, 61 Sup. Ct. 1085 (U. S.
1941), and Ismert-Hinke Milling Co. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 27 (1939). The court
also recognizes that there may be a distinction in the pleadings in United States v.
Hagan & Cushing Co., 115 F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940), but adheres to the views
expressed in the dissenting opinion in that case.
25. KEENEM, QuAsI-CoTRAcrs (1893) 1-20; WOODWARD, QUAsI-CONTRAcTS (1913)
§ 3; Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations (1912) 21 Y.AL L. J. 533; Lewisohn,
Contract Distinguished from Quasi-Contract (1914) 2 CAIrF. L. REv. 171,
26. RESTATEMENT, RFSTITUTION (1937) §§ 1, 48.
27. Some courts seem to have taken an opposite view. See Rieder v. Rogan, 12 F.
Supp. 307 (S. D. Cal. 1935) (judicial notice taken that under modern accounting
systems it is possible to trace in even the most complex organizations the approximate
cost of every item going into the making of the whole product).; United States v.
Jefferson Elect. Co., 291 U. S. 386, 402 (1934) ("If the taxpayer has borne the burden
of the tax, he can readily show it. .. ").
28. Johnson v. Igleheart Bros., 95 F. (2d) 4 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), cert. denied,
304 U. S. 585 (1938); Heckman v. I. S. Dawes & Son, 12 F. (2d) 154 (App. D. C.
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as a separate item outside the actual purchase price may block recovery
by buyers, despite obvious equities in their favor.
While the mistake-of-law rule has no plausible justification,2 9 there are
logical and practical arguments for requiring separation of tax and price.
Since the sine qua non of the quasi-contractual action is a total failure of
consideration or purpose3 ' it must clearly appear that the party asking
for restitution has paid a definite amount for a specific purpose. Where only
a single composite price is stated to a purchaser, the latter is said tu be
paying only the amount demanded for the goods and is not reimbursing
the seller for any tax.31 As a practical matter, moreover, the economic
forces determining price in a competitive economy are so many and so
intricate that it is virtually impossible to break down the price into com-
ponent parts and to determine what portion represents the amount of the
tax.32 In the usual case, therefore, a statement by the seller of the amount
of tax which he is passing on is almost a necessity.
As a decisive factor in the processing tax cases, however, application of
the separate tax item rule seems clearly unwarranted. Although the tax
was not separately itemized, the parties had expressly agreed that the amount
had been included in the sale price. 33 The fact, moreover, that under the
1926) ; Noll Baking & Ice Cream Co. v. Sparks Milling Co., 304 Ill. App. 624, 26 N. E.
(2d) 425 (1940) ; Southern Biscuit Co. v. Lloyd, 174 Va. 299, 6 S. E. (2d) 601 (1940).
29. See KEFvm, QUASI-CONrRAcTS 85-91; REsTrxTEmFux"T, RsT1"£io.ITTo (1937)
179-81; SuAvmr AND Scor, Novas ox. RESTATEMENT OF REsrTrlio (1937) 35-33.
In Wayne County Produce Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co., 244 N. Y. 351, 355, 155 N. _.
669, 670 (1927), the court reasons that the "quality of the mistake [fact or law]
did not prevent the defendant from recovering the money from the Government. It
cannot absolve from the duty of disposing of the money thus recovered as good
conscience shall dictate."
30. REsTATEENT, REsTrruToN (1937) §48; KEENE., Qu.%si-CovaAcrs 34 ct seq.
31. Lash's Products Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 175 (1929), has often been
cited as authority for this proposition. At 176, the court says: "The purchaser does
not pay the tax. He pays or may pay the seller more for the goods because of the
seller's increased obligation, but that is all. . . . The amount added because of the
tax is to get the goods and for nothing else." Since, however, this case involved the
interpretation of a technical ruling by the Treasury, its authority is questionable.
32. Besides the difficulty in allocating the various items mating up total price,
the problem is further complicated by changes in supply and demand curves following
the imposition of a tax. Resulting changes in production and prices introduce new
elements which must be considered in judging the shifting of a tax. See Johnson,
AAA Refunds: A Study in Tax Incidence (1937) 37 Co. L REv. 910.
33. There are four commonly-used methods of shifting the economic burden of a
tax: (1) the seller may merely include the tax in a total or composite price; (2) the
seller may follow the method used by processors-composite price but statement that tax
is included; (3) the seller may represent that a certain fraction of the price represents
the tax; (4) the seller may separate price and tax completely. The last two methods
are to all intents identical in legal effect. United States v. Jefferson Elect. Co., 291
U. S. 386 (1934). But see Cupples Co. v. Mooney, 25 S. IV. (2d) 125 (App. St. L.
1930) (price under contract stating 1/41 of price to be federal excise tax held com-
posite). The second method is different from the last two only in that the exact amount
19411
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"up and down" clause the processor had agreed to reimburse the buyer in
case of reduction of the tax was strong indication that the former had
actually passed on the tax.34 In addition, there was never any doubt about
the amount due under any contract. The tax could be computed directly
on the finished product as sold by the processor. 3 In substance, therefore,
the result was the same as though the seller had taken the formal step of
separately itemizing the taxes. While these considerations were present in
all processing tax cases, the separate tax item rule was uniformly invoked
as a ground for denying recovery. Even where the Government was plaintiff
and other objections to recovery were absent, courts failed to abandon the
rule.30 The more realistic approach in the American Packing Company case
sensibly modifies the rule by giving presumptive effect to the tax clause.
Even if the buyer is able to surmount the separate tax rule, however,
he must do more than prove that the seller has been enriched. In the pro-
cessing tax cases, the buyer has been required to prove in purely economic
terms that he has sustained a loss as a result of the seller's enrichment.31
Where the buyer has himself shifted the burden of the tax to his vendees,
the courts hold that recovery must be denied. In comparable cases prior to
the processing tax, however, the question of the buyer's actual loss does not
seem to have arisen. On the contrary, where recovery has been granted,
it was considered sufficient that the buyer had proved that the tax had been
passed to him in the form of a separate item and that the seller had escaped
its payment.38 How the buyer obtained the funds to pay this item was not
a factor in the decisions. Besides lack of precedent, the inclusion of this
factor in the processing tax cases involves a logical inconsistency. In deter-
mining the seller's enrichment, courts have taken the legalistic position that
a tax cannot be passed on unless separately itemized.30 The buyer, on the
other hand, is forced to frame his case on an economic level by the require-
ment of proof that he has not shifted the tax burden. To be consistent,
of the tax passed on does not appear in the contract. Where, however, the amount of
the tax on each unit sold is mathematically certain, as in the case of a sales or excise
tax, the distinction between the second method and the last two fails. United States
v. American Packing and Provision Co., 122 F. (2d) 445 (C. C. A. 10th, 1941).
34. The "up and down" clause might also evidence an intent of the parties to
treat the tax as a separate and distinct item in the transactions. United States v. -agan-
Cushing Co., 115 F. (2d) 849, 852 (C. C.A. 9th, 1940) (dissenting opinion).
35. See note 23 supra.
36. United States v. Hagan-Cushing Co., 115 F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940);
Kansas Flour Mills v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 390 (1941), cert. granted, 61 Sup. Ct.
1085 (U. S. 1941); Ismert-Hinke Milling Co. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 27 (1939).
37. See cases cited supra note 12.
38. Wayne County Prod. Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co., 244 N, Y. 351, 155 N. E. 669
(1927) (federal excise tax) ; Solomon Tobacco Co. v. Cohen, 184 N. Y. 308, 77 N. E.
257 (1906) (import duty); Friend v. Rosenwald, 124 App. Div. 226, 108 N. Y. Supp.
701 (1st Dep't 1908) (import duty).
39. Golding Bros. v. Dumaine, 93 F. (2d) 162 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937); Heckman
& Co. v. I. S. Dawes & Soil, 12 F. (2d) 154 (App. D. C. 1926) ; cf. Lash's Products
v. United States, 278 U. S. 175 (1929).
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the same rule should apply to the purchaser's loss as to the seller's gain.
If the legalistic position is adopted, it should be held as a matter of law
that the buyer has not passed on the tax to his vendees where he has sold
at a single composite price.
Despite the logical inconsistency, however, the economic proof demanded
of the buyer has practical justification. To permit recovery without clear
evidence of loss would operate merely to transfer the seller's enrichment
to the buyer. Where the Government is the buyer, it can readily prove its
assumption of the burden of the tax. In the typical case, however, the
processor has passed the tax directly along to the buyer of processed com-
modities. The latter in turn distributes the burden among the mass of
consumers in the form of higher prices.40 Furthermore, the windfall tax
applies to buyers as well as processors.41 Unless the buyer had proved his
absorption of the tax, he would subsequently be forced to disgorge the lion's
share of his recovery. The consequent circuity is perhaps a strong induce-
ment for the courts to deny restitution.42
Although the windfall tax has not been emphasized as an important
factor in the cases, a situation might well arise where it would be the crucial
issue. If the buyer could otherwise establish his right to restitution, the
seller might nevertheless contend that payment to the Government under
the terms of the statute had discharged his entire obligation to the buyer.a
The decision of Congress, however, to tax away the major portion of the
enrichment is not a legislative determination that it is entirely eliminated. 44
Since the windfall tax applies to only 80% of any enrichment, the buyer
should be allowed to recover the remaining 207.45 On the contractual count,
40. Studies made of the economic effects of the processing taxes show that con-
sumer expenditures for agricultural commodities during the period when the taxes
were in effect increased by approximately the amount of the taxes collected. See Noimsr,
Tinun YEARS OF THE AAA (1937) 401-12.
41. IxT. R v. CODE § 700(2) (1939).
42. See Ph. Orth Co. v. New Richmond Roller Mills Co., 232 Wis. 491, 493-99,
287 N. V. 713, 717 (1939). In addition, recovery without proof of absorption would
encourage multiple actions by enriching the buyer in relation to his vendees. See (1941)
30 Ky. L. J. 118.
43. The argument would be predicated upon the assumption that the windfall
tax was intended to effect a complete disposal of the funds collected by processors
under the invalid statute, to the exclusion of any private claims. Where the United
States is plaintiff-buyer, the further argument might be made that, having two alternative
remedies, it should not be permitted to bring suit after choosing to act under the
windfall tax statute.
44. The figure of 80%l was apparently arrived at through a compromise in Congress.
The subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means recommended a 90% rate,
while other representatives suggested 75%. In the discussions, it was intimated that
a 100% tax would be confiscatory. See Hearings before Conmtilce on Fi:ance on
H. R. 12395, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 863; H. R. REP. No. 2475, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 11. See also Comment (1937) 50 HAtv. L. REv. 477.
45. In none of the cases where the seller's payment of the windfall tax was
relied upon .as a ground to defeat the action did the buyer raise the question of the
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the objection would remain that the "up and down" clause in the contract
was not intended to cover the contingency of unconstitutionality. It has
been suggested, on the other hand, that the provisions of the windfall tax
in effect constitute a 20% reduction in the processing tax and that the
processor is obligated to make a refund under the terms of the contract.40
On quasi-contractual grounds, restitution might be blocked by the rules
formulated in the usual processing tax cases. If, however, the buyer could
avoid the composite price rule and prove that he sustained a loss, his recovery
of 20%o would be facilitated.
A "windfall" tax, therefore, does not eliminate the enrichment problem
represented in the processing tax cases. In absence of more effective legis-
lation, quasi-contractual principles should be geared to yield results in con-
formity with economic fact. The buyer should be required to prove in
economic terms that he has absorbed the tax and has not shifted it to his
vendees. 47 Since private buyers have opportunity to pass along the tax,
the burden of proof properly falls more heavily on them. Both the Govern-
ment and private parties, however, should be permitted to show by whatever
means possible that the seller shifted the tax to them. Separate itemization
of the tax should be eliminated as a condition precedent to recovery. Recog-
nition of these considerations in the American Packing Company case points
the way toward sounder treatment of similar enrichment issues.
remaining 20%. The reason probably is that such cases also failed on the mistake-of-law
rule, the composite-price rule, or because the buyer had failed to allege his absorption
of the tax. See cases cited supra note 14.
46. (1938) 33 ILL. L. REv. 354, 356, n. 15.
47. The statute relative to refunds of processing taxes by the United States imposes
this burden on processors. Revenue Act of 1936, §§ 901-17. Suits under that statute
indicate that the requirement of proof is difficult, but not insuperable. See Hornbuilt
Prod., Inc. v. Commissioner, 119 F. (2d) 797 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); H. T. Poindexter
& Sons v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 787 (D. Mo. 1941); cf. Luzien's, Inc. v. Nee,
106 F. (2d) 130 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
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